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Article 4

The Compensation Myth and U.C.C.
Section 2-713
David Frisch†
INTRODUCTION
Writing twenty-five years ago, Professor Robert Childress
argued quite persuasively that the market-price/contract-price
formula in section 2-713 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code
or U.C.C.)1 “is not a legitimate damage remedy for breach of
contract” and ought to be repealed.2 Since then, no single
authoritative or canonical statement of the theory underlying
section 2-713 has emerged. In their treatise, Professors James
J. White and Robert S. Summers raise the idea that perhaps
section 2-713 is best understood as a statutory liquidated
damages clause,3 or merely a relic of pre-Code law.4 Professor
† Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.S., University of
Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Miami School of Law; LL.M. Yale Law School. I would like
to thank Scott Siegner and Shaun Freiman for their research and editorial assistance.
1 U.C.C. § 2-713 reads:

Section 2-713. Buyer’s Damages for Non-Delivery or Repudiation. (1) Subject
to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price (Section
2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller
is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer
learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and
consequential damages provided in this Article (2-715), but less expenses
saved in consequence of the seller’s breach. (2) Market price is to be
determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection after arrival or
revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.
U.C.C. § 2-713 (2013). The Code, in one form or another, is the law in all fifty states,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
2 Robert Childres, Buyer’s Remedies: The Danger of Section 2-713, 72 NW. U.
L. REV. 837, 853 (1978).
3 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 401
(5th ed. 1996). In her article on remedies, then-Professor and later Chief Justice of the
Connecticut Supreme Court, Ellen Peters makes the same observation.
Perhaps it is misleading to think of the market-contract formula as a device
for the measurement of damages . . . . An alternative way of looking at
market-contract is to view this differential as a statutory liquidated damages
clause, rather than as an effort to calculate actual losses. If it is useful in
every case to hold the party in breach to some baseline liability, in order to
encourage faithful adherence to contractual obligations, perhaps market
fluctuations furnish as good a standard as any.
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Roy Ryden Anderson adds that “[w]hatever the purpose of
section 2-713, it clearly is not compensation.”5
This article seeks to bring greater discipline to the
analysis of market damages by probing two basic assumptions
that are routinely made in discussions of section 2-713: (1) that
overcompensation concerns justify judicial interference with
the buyer’s choice of remedy;6 and (2) that the relevant market
price, in all cases, is the market price that the aggrieved buyer
would be required to pay if she wished to make a substitute
purchase of goods elsewhere.7
In questioning these assumptions, this article does not
question whether section 2-713 should continue to exist, nor
does it suggest changes to the statutory text. Rather, it proposes
a radical rethinking of the application of section 2-713 in several
of its contexts. Although academic scholarship touching on the
U.C.C. often concludes with a recommendation for the rewording
or deletion of a particular section, this article does not seek to
change the statutory path of the law for essentially two reasons.
First, the sudden disappearance of a frequently cited
and extensively studied section of the U.C.C. may create a wide
array of problems within the legal community. Judges, lawyers,
and legal scholars would be left scratching their heads,
searching for some rationale behind such an imperial and
unnecessarily ambitious decision. In this alternative commercial
Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 259 (1963).
4 As White and Summers stated:
Since cover under 2-712 was not a recognized remedy under pre-Code law, it
made sense under that law to say that the contract-market formula put buyer
in the same position as performance would have on the assumption that the
buyer would purchase substitute goods. If things worked right, the market
price would approximate the cost of the substitute goods and buyer would be
put “in the same position.” But under the Code, 2-712 does this job with
greater precision, and 2-713 reigns over only those cases where the buyer
does not purchase a substitute. Perhaps the drafters retained 2-713 not out of
a belief in its appropriateness, but out of fear that they would be dismissed as
iconoclasts had they proposed that the court in noncover cases simply award
the buyer any economic loss proximately caused by seller’s breach . . . .
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 400-01.
5 Roy Ryden Anderson, Market Based Damages for Buyers Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 6 REV. LITIG. 1, 6 (1987). Notwithstanding numerous
detractors, section 2-713 does have its supporters. See, e.g., David W. Carroll, A Little
Essay in Partial Defense of the Contract-Market Differential as a Remedy for Buyers, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 667 (1984) (arguing that the contract-market differential provides an
adequate compensatory remedy in practically all cases of the seller’s breach). For more
on the theoretical criticisms of section 2-713, see infra Parts III, IV.
6 Roy Ryden Anderson, Damage Remedies Under the Emerging Article 2—An
Essay Against Freedom, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1065, 1103 (1997).
7 GREGORY KLASS, CONTRACT LAW IN THE USA 225 (Kluwer Law
International 2010).
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law universe, a judge facing a case with an evident section 2-713
feature may stubbornly adhere to other cases with such a
feature regardless of how the Code has changed. Of greater
concern is the possibility that repeal may have an unforeseen
impact on other sections of the U.C.C., which may negatively
affect the Code’s remedial system as a whole. If at all possible,
statutory tinkering should be kept to a minimum.
Second, we are unlikely to see a drafting project to
revise or amend Article 2 anytime soon. The political reality is
that after an unsuccessful two-decade-long battle to draft and
win approval of a new Article 2, it is improbable that the
Uniform Law Commission (ULC) and the American Law
Institute (ALI) leadership would be anxious to again take a
drafting approach to ward off whatever threat of statutory
obsolescence may currently exist under this Article.8 Thus, a
different strategy (i.e. one of interpretation) is required to help
keep Article 2 responsive to twenty-first century commercial
practices and guide courts toward the best results.
This article unfolds in four parts. Part I briefly surveys
the basic features of the damages provisions of Article 2 of the
Code, together with a bit of historical background. Part II,
begins with a brief discussion of the generally accepted idea
that, in a breach of contract context, a damages award is
designed to achieve deterrence and full compensation for the
promisee. Expectation damages are believed to accomplish
these twin goals by giving precise incentives and awarding
damages equal to the promisee’s loss. This Part then
demonstrates why, in general, it should not be expected that an
award of a monetary nature will yield efficient results and that
much of the theorizing that surrounds discussions of contract
damages is based on the myth that the relevant market price is
the price that the aggrieved buyer would have to pay if she
wished to make a substitute purchase of goods from another
source. Part III shifts to three issues concerning the application
of section 2-713 and offers a nuanced analysis of these issues
8 See generally Updates, 88th ALI Annual Meeting May 16-18, 2011,
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://2011am.ali.org/updates.cfm (last visited Aug. 18,
2014); Gordon Smith, Withdrawing the 2003 Amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A,
THE CONGLOMERATE (May 17, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/05/
withdrawing-the-2003-amendments-to-ucc-articles-2-and-2a.html. During the 1990s
there were a variety of efforts to revise or amend Article 2 to better deal with modern
commercial contracting. The two sponsors of the U.C.C. project—the ULC and the
ALI—finally presented an Amended Article 2 to the states for adoption in 2003. After
almost a decade, no state has adopted the amendments. In 2011, the sponsors
withdrew their support and, hence, Amended Article 2 from the Official Text of the
U.C.C., thereby bringing down the curtain on a long drafting project that has
frustrated many and has probably satisfied no one.
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that is grounded in realistic thinking about the contract
liability system. Finally, in Part IV, this article debunks the
conventional wisdom that the relevant market in which to
determine the price component of the damages formula in
section 2-713 is always the market in which the buyer is likely
to go to make a substitute purchase (i.e., cover). In so doing, it
suggests one significant consequence of an altered approach.
I.

THE DAMAGES RULES OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE UCC

Part 7 of Article 2 sets forth the ground rules by which
aggrieved parties⎯both sellers and buyers⎯may recover
damages for breach.9 These ground rules are stated in terms of
both the classification and measurement of damages. On the
classification side, the Code draws substantive distinctions
among incidental, consequential, punitive, and general or direct
damages. The classification matters to sellers because they are
generally allowed, under section 1-305, to recover only general
and incidental damages, but not consequential or punitive
damages.10 The classification matters to buyers because
consequential economic losses are subject to the “notice” or
“foreseeability” requirement of Hadley v. Baxendale,11 which
limits liability for consequential damages to those losses that
should have been contemplated by the contracting parties—or,
as expressed in the Code, losses of which the parties had “reason
to know.”12 General and incidental damages are not expressly
subject to such a requirement.
9 Since this article focuses on the buyer’s damages, it entirely ignores the
possessory, see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-716 (2013) (“Buyer’s Right to Specific Performance or
Replevin”) and self-help goods-oriented remedies, see, e.g., id. § 2-608 (“Revocation of
Acceptance in Whole or in Part”), that are sometimes available to plaintiffs. However,
in this oversimplified overview of damages, seller’s damages are not ignored. In reality,
the parallels between how the buyer’s and the seller’s damages are measured will help
focus and organize the discussion that follows.
10 Section 1-305 provides, in part, that “neither consequential or special
damages nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in [the Uniform
Commercial Code] or by other rule of law.” U.C.C. § 1-305 (alteration in original). The
Comment states that the purpose is to make clear that “compensatory damages are
limited to compensation” and that “[t]hey do not include consequential or special
damages.” Id. § 1-305 cmt. 1. Section 2-715 makes special provision for buyers to
recover consequential damages, not sellers. Id. § 2-715. Such a recovery by sellers may
be possible, however, if the “lost profit” language of section 2-708(2) is liberally applied.
Id. § 2-708(2). Another avenue for accomplishing the same result is for the seller to
argue that the loss falls under the heading of incidental damages. A seller may recover
incidental damages under section 2-710. Id. § 2.710.
11 See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.) 149-52.
12 See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (stating that consequential damages include “any loss
resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time
of contracting had reason to know”) (emphasis added); Cf. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
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As to both buyers and sellers, Article 2 sets forth
numerous methods for calculating general damages, the
choice of which typically turns on whether the aggrieved party
retains finished goods. Under section 2-708(1), if the seller
retains possession of the goods following the buyer’s
repudiation or wrongful rejection, the seller’s damages will
often be the difference between the market price at the time
and place for tender and the unpaid contract price.13 Section
2-713 provides a somewhat similar market price-contract
price formula for buyers.14
It helps to appreciate some history here. In keeping with
the legal realist agenda to protect and promote reasonable
mercantile practices,15 Karl Llewellyn, the chief reporter for the
Code and the principal draftsperson for Article 2, was
particularly scornful of the market time and place basis for

13 The lost profits formula in section 2-708(2) will sometimes provide an
alternative measure of damages. If the seller resells the goods following the buyer’s
breach, the measure would be the difference between the resale price and the contract
price under section 2-706. This assumes that the seller has complied with the
mandates of that section.
14 For the complete text of section 2-713, see supra note 1. Under this section, the
relevant temporal point for determining market price is “when the buyer learned of the
breach.” U.C.C. § 2-713. This changes the approach to market price taken by the Uniform
Sales Act (USA), Article 2’s statutory antecedent. The USA made relevant the market price
as it existed when the goods “ought to have been delivered.” U.S.A. § 67(3) (1908).
15 The term “legal realism” has its genesis in an article by Karl Llewellyn.
See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
431 (1930). Although realism was “neither a coherent intellectual movement nor a
consistent or systematic jurisprudence,” Horowitz explains that “above all, Realism is a
continuation of the Progressive attack on the attempt of late-nineteenth-century
Classical Legal Thought to create a sharp distinction between law and politics and to
portray law as neutral, natural, and apolitical.” MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
169-70 (Oxford University Press, Inc. 1992).
Llewellyn was one of the most influential figures in the realist assault on
the conceptualism of the old order. See generally WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN
AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973) (providing an interpretation of Llewellyn’s
thought and its development). He believed in finding the law in the commercial context
that gave rise to the dispute. Accordingly, the judicial task was to discover this socalled “imminent law.” Llewellyn accepted the view that:

Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can take it in,
carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is a
natural law which is real, not imaginary; it is not a creature of mere
reason, but rests on the solid foundation of what reason can recognize in
the nature of man and of the life conditions of the time and place; it is thus
not eternal nor changeless nor everywhere the same, but is indwelling in
the very circumstances of life. The highest task of law-giving consists in
uncovering and implementing this immanent law.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 122 (1960)
(quoting Levin Goldschmidt).
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measuring damages.16 Llewellyn was also concerned with the
difficulties surrounding the seller’s right of resale under the
Uniform Sales Act (USA) section 6017 and the fact that there was
no corresponding statutory right of the buyer to “cover” or obtain
goods elsewhere to make up for the seller’s failure to deliver.18
The Code cured these statutory deficiencies by including a
spectrum of remedies afforded to both sellers and buyers.
When the buyer has accepted the goods, the recovery
rule for general damages is “the loss resulting in the ordinary
course of events . . . as determined in any manner which is
reasonable.”19 However, for breach of warranty claims under
section 2-714, the buyer’s damages are based on “the
difference . . . between the value of the goods accepted and the
16

Litigation of a hypothetical market price in a[ ] hypothetical market is indeed
always expensive and always uncertain; and as interpreted, the rule of “time
and place where the goods ought to have been delivered” too commonly forces
the issue to turn on a[ ] hypothetical market; and, too often, an unexpected
ruling chooses a market on which counsel is not prepared; or even results in a
reversal, in addition to giving inadequate damages.
REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT: THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT (1941), reprinted in 1
ELIZABETH SLUSSER KELLY, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 523 (1984).
17 USA section 60 permitted resale by the seller where (1) the goods were of a
perishable nature, or (2) the seller had reserved the right to resell upon the buyer’s
default, or (3) the buyer had been in default for an unreasonable period of time.
Following such a resale, the seller would recover damages “for any loss occasioned by
the breach of the contract of sale.” U.S.A. § 60. Notice that this provision provides no
explicit formula to measure the damages recoverable by the seller following the resale.
Under the Code, so long as the resale is conducted “in good faith and in a commercially
reasonable manner, the seller may recover the difference between the resale price and
the contract price” plus incidental damages. See U.C.C. § 2-706.
18 Several early versions of what later became U.C.C. Article 2 were labeled
the “Revised Uniform Sales Act (RUSA).” See, e.g., REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT, supra
note 16, at 269. In drafts of the RUSA, Llewellyn used the term “cover” to describe both
the seller’s right to resell and the buyer’s right to purchase substitute goods. See id. at
522. Today the term is used only to describe the buyer’s remedy. See U.C.C. § 2-712. In
the following passage, Llewellyn explains how cover, for both buyers and sellers,
reaffirms mercantile practice:
[The cover remedy] make[s] it possible, in transactions between professionals
in the market, for the justified claimant, be he buyer or seller, to fix [h]is
rig[h]ts with speed, after a breach, and then to move, with safety, in such
manner as to get in fact the agreed benefit under the contract, or so much of
it as is still available. . . . It not only steps up the certainties which the law
can provide to help contractors, fitting into mercantile need and mercantile
practice; but it also lays a foundation for cheaper and more adequate
administration, at law, of the other remedies. . . . These sections incorporate
the long standing practice of the English courts to give the aggrieved party
reasonable time, on discovering breach, to cover himself in any reasonable
way. Any litigation after cover has actually been sought and had is thus made
to turn first on a fact easy to prove: to wit, what loss was actually suffered.
REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT, supra note 16, at 522-23.
19 U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
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value they would have had if they had been as warranted,”
except when “special circumstances show proximate damages
of a different amount.”20
It may be helpful to make a general observation
regarding Article 2’s remedial scheme. Stated boldly, it is
exceptional among statutory regimes by not prescribing a
general standard of recovery for the aggrieved party, but instead
employing specific formulas for computing damages.21 Ironically,
other articles of the Code provide ample instances of damages
provisions lacking such prescribed methods of calculation.
Scattered throughout the Code are sections that provide simply
for the recovery of “damages” with no guidance whatsoever on
how those damages should be determined.22
In fact, Article 2’s damages rules may suffer from too
much specificity. Perhaps it would be better to replace precise
rules with a general standard of compensation, such as the
standard found in U.C.C. section 1-305. Section 1-305 states in
part: “The remedies provided by [the Uniform Commercial Code]
must be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved
party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had
fully performed . . . .”23 This might encourage courts to focus
directly on the real-life facts of cases, combat the judicial
manipulation of statutory language, and oblige judges to be
more forthcoming about the reasons for their decisions.
Moreover, even if we accept, arguendo, the proposition that the
Id. § 2-714(2).
Interestingly, at least one commentator has taken the position that even
more specificity is needed. See John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies under Article Two of the
Uniform Commercial Code: An Agenda for Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 360 (1981). Sebert’s
analysis begins with the conclusion that “[t]he portion of article 2 that seems to evidence
the most pervasive problems is part 7, which deals with remedies for breach.” Id. at 363.
This is so, according to Sebert, “because the Code’s remedy provisions are not sufficiently
specific to provide the necessary guidance to courts and litigants.” Id.
While it is tempting to think that making the rules even more specific would
reduce the confusion and stem the tide of case law that continues to flow from the Article
2 provisions, this approach is unlikely to improve matters. Simply put, there is little
reason to think that adding more provisions will ease the preoccupation of litigants and
courts with issues of applicability and scope. Indeed, it seems far likelier that—to the
extent that rules multiply and unanticipated situations continue to arise—disputes over
which rule applies and how it applies in a given context will escalate.
22 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-402 (“A payor bank is liable to its customer for
damages proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item.”); id. § 5-111(b) (“If
an issuer wrongfully dishonors a draft or demand presented under a letter of credit or
honors a draft or demand in breach of its obligation to the applicant, the applicant may
recover damages resulting from the breach . . . .); id. § 7-203 (“A party to or purchaser
for value in good faith of a document of title . . . relying in either case upon the
description therein of the goods may recover from the issuer damages caused by the
non-receipt or misdescription of the goods . . . .”); id. § 9-625(b) (“[A] person is liable for
damages in the amount of any loss caused by a failure to comply with this article.”).
23 Id. § 1-305.
20

21
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specific measures in Article 2 are helpful, one may at least
question whether it is healthy for courts to purport to be bound
by them when in fact they are free under section 1-305 to
disregard them entirely.24
Assuming, however, that the structure of Article 2 will
not change in the foreseeable future, suggestions such as the
foregoing are unlikely to bear much fruit. In light of practical
approaches that courts can now take, let us turn first to the
myth of overcompensation and its implications for section 2-713.
II.

THE FULL COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE AND THE MYTH OF
OVERCOMPENSATION

A.

The Full Compensation Principle

Historically, the full compensation principle has been
relied upon to ensure that contract remedies facilitate, rather
than interfere with, the role of bilateral exchange in the voluntary
transactions that allocate resources in a market economy. The
mechanism on which courts have settled to implement this
imperative is, in the common run of cases, to award damages in
an amount sufficient to place the aggrieved party in as good a
monetary position as she would have been had the contract been
performed,25 or as is frequently said, to give the aggrieved party
“the benefit of the bargain.”26 Because of the difficulties in forcing
people to continue a relationship they no longer wish to continue,
the law of remedies permits the aggrieved party to compel the
other party’s performance through legal means only in those
instances where damages are unsuitable.27
There is an obverse side to this normative coin. From the
proposition that the central tenet of contract remedies is full
compensation, it follows that it is not just instances of undercompensation that should be avoided. Because the distinct
function of contract remedies is to improve economic outcomes
by allocating assets to the higher value user, and because
overcompensation would interfere with this economic outcome,
overcompensation should be scrupulously avoided as well.
The theory of “efficient breach” offers a supporting
economic justification for a remedial system premised on full

24
25
26
27

For more on this point, see infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
See U.C.C. § 1-305; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) cmt. a (1981).
See id. at 99-100.
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compensation⎯not more, not less.28 According to the theory,
incentives for contract performance are efficient if they compel a
promisor to balance the cost to him of performing against the
losses to himself and to his counter-party that will result if he
does not perform. This calculus would correctly encourage
breach only if the value of the gain to the promisor exceeded
the damage or loss to the non-breaching party. If, on the other
hand, the promisor’s liability for damages were greater than
the benefit to be gained from breaching, presumably the
promisor would elect to perform the contract instead.29 The
result, breach of performance, is defended on the ground that a
Pareto superior30 allocation of resources results because
promisors are thereby encouraged to direct their efforts to the
most valued use. Moreover, full compensation has the added
benefit of encouraging reliance on contract rights because,
breach or no breach, the promisee knows that she will receive
the benefit of her bargain. If, however, aggrieved promisees
were systematically undercompensated, promisors would not
internalize the full value of performance to promisees and we
would risk too much breach.31 Of course, overcompensation
would have just the opposite effect.32
The full compensation principle is not as firmly rooted
in all legal systems. Consider, for example, the power of the
parties to decide for themselves the amount or measure of
28 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 89-90 (2nd ed.
1977) (“If that loss is greater than the gain to the other party from completion, breach
would be value-maximizing and should be encouraged.”); see generally id. at 118-90.
29 For judicial expressions of this idea, see, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys.,
841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Even if the breach is deliberate, it is not necessarily
blameworthy. The promisor may simply have discovered that his performance is worth
more to someone else. If so, efficiency is promoted by allowing him to break his
promise, provided he makes good the promisee’s actual losses.”); Giampapa v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230, 251 (Colo. 2003) (“The theory of ‘efficient breach’
posits that the purpose of contract law is not to discourage all breaches. To the
contrary, certain breaches, such as those where the breaching party’s gains exceed the
injured party’s losses, are thought to be desirable.”).
30 In a Pareto Efficiency paradigm, a Pareto superior outcome is one in which
one party benefits to the detraction of none. “A change in the status quo is considered
to be Pareto superior if it makes at least one person better off without making anyone
else worse off.” ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (West Publ’g Co. 1990) (emphasis omitted).
31 See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48
DUKE L.J. 629, 664 (1999) (“If the breaching party is not responsible for the nonbreaching party’s full loses, then there is an incentive to breach even when the breach
would not be efficient.”).
32 This notion accords remarkably with the historical unwillingness of courts to
award punitive damages in breach of contract actions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 355. But see Dodge, supra note 31, at 663 (“Allowing a party to breach a
contract and pay damages is not as efficient as forcing that party, with the threat of punitive
damages, to negotiate with the other party for a release from the contract.”).
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damages in advance of any breach. In the U.S., this concept of
stipulated or liquidated damages is subject to several
restrictions.33 “The most important restriction” is that if the sum
of money chosen is unreasonably large, the clause is void as a
penalty.34 Such an approach is clearly consistent with the idea
that the purpose of damages is to compensate the aggrieved
party, not to deter or punish the party in breach.35
In sum, most courts and commentators accept the
damages principle of full compensation as both fair and efficient.
It is fair because, at least in theory, it provides an adequate
performance substitute for the aggrieved party. Furthermore, it
is efficient because of its incentive effects.
B.

Challenging Two Assumptions of the Full Compensation
Principle

Let us now turn to two assumptions underlying the
rhetoric of full compensation and its supporting economic
justification, the doctrine of efficient breach. This article
suggests that much of the theorizing that surrounds discussions
of contract damages is grounded in myth. One myth is that
promisors can and do internalize the costs of their breach as part of
their decision-making process. The second myth is that full
compensation of promisees, when attempted, is routinely achieved.
1. The Myth that Contractual Choices are Premised on
Accurate Damage Assessments
A realistic picture of the actual (rather than the assumed
or asserted) decision-making behavior of contracting parties is a
necessary but missing ingredient for addressing a wide range of
questions regarding the full compensation principle. Unless the
picture is sufficiently detailed and thoughtfully analyzed, it
would be impossible to distinguish the effects of the law of
damages from the effects of social, business, or other factors,
including more general features of the law that bear on the
collectability of judgment claims. For example, it is likely that
the promisee’s potential ability to satisfy a judgment is
sometimes a factor in the promisor’s decision whether or not to
See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 935-46 (2d ed. 1990).
Id. at 935.
35 However, not all countries prohibit contractual penalties. For a discussion
of the full enforceability of penal clauses in France, subject to the discretionary
moderating power of the judge, see James Beardsley, Compelling Contract Performance
in France, 1 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93, 103-07 (1977).
33

34
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breach. Even uninformed common sense shows more breaches to
be probable, whether they be efficient or not, if the promisee is
unlikely to satisfy a judgment through litigation.36 As a result,
most discussions of the positive case for the full compensation
principle are unavoidably speculative. Nevertheless, “intuition”
can provide at least a few suggestions for the real-world gap
between the goals of the full compensation principle and
attitudes towards contract performance.
First, the existing measures of damages cannot
realistically be characterized as bedrock rules on which parties
actually rely. There is empirical evidence to suggest that legal
rules may be less relevant to the day-to-day practices of
commercial transactors than one might guess.37 Stewart
Macaulay, in a famous and often-cited article, had this to say
about the real world of commercial practice:
Contract planning and contract law, at best, stand at the margin of
important long-term continuing business relations. Business people
often do not plan, exhibit great care in drafting contracts, pay much
attention to those that lawyers carefully draft, or honor a legal
approach to business relationships. There are business cultures
defining the risks assumed in bargains, and what should be done
when things go wrong. People perform disadvantageous contracts
today because often this gains credit that they can draw on in the
future. People often renegotiate deals that have turned out badly for
one or both sides. They recognize a range of excuses much broader
than those accepted by most legal systems.38

Indeed, it is hard to imagine that any particular measure of
damages is seriously considered by the parties or their lawyers
prior to breach. In the real world, the dynamics of business
contracting suggest that busy parties may proceed with little
thought to even critical terms like price and delivery date, let
alone damages. Many aspects of Article 2 are premised on the
rough and tumble world of real-life contracting. In this respect,
36 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1996)
(noting that “[t]he system by which money judgments are enforced is beginning to fail.
The immediate cause is the deployment of legal structures that render potential
defendants judgment proof”).
37 See generally Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS.
L. REV. 465 (1985).
38 Id. at 467-68; see also Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice
and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5 (1992) (suggesting that “it is a delusion to assume
that commercial conduct is primarily controlled by what is ‘legal’”) (citing James J.
White, Contract Law in Modern Commercial Transactions, An Artifact of Twentieth
Century Business Life?, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 19 (1982)); White, supra note 38, at 1-2
(conducting an empirical study of chemical and pharmaceutical companies and offering
the “thesis that contract law is a much less significant determinant of commercial
behavior in complex transactions than the typical law student, contracts professor, or
lawyer dares believe”).
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sections 2-204, 2-206, and 2-207 dispense with many of the
common law formalities in contracting, making it unnecessary
for a court to find the exact moment of formation, recognizing
that parties may leave open one or more terms.39
Even if the promisor attempted to estimate the expected
value of the damages he would be ordered to pay if suit is
brought and make his decision accordingly, it is improbable
that even the most legally savvy individual would be able to
foresee all, or nearly all, of the contingencies and consequences
of the breach. This conclusion is undeniable if courts are
willing to permit the recovery of damages premised on postbreach events. For instance, in Sinclair Refinery Co. v. Jenkins
Petroleum Process Co., where Sinclair violated Jenkins’s
patent, the court allowed the subsequent (post-breach) use of
the patent to be used as a factor in calculating respondent’s
damages.40 Even if ex post data were off limits, it would often
be the case that the promisor would not have an accurate
picture of the factual underpinnings of the promisee’s economic
situation. With an inaccurate picture, the promisor’s conclusion
regarding the amount of damages that she would face is likely
to be in error.
Consider, for example, what Professors Omri BenShahar and Lisa Bernstein observed about lost profit claims:
When a breach occurs and expectation damages are sought, the
expectation measure will often include lost profit. Lost profit is
typically calculated on the basis of business information related to
the promisee’s operations, such as material and labor costs,
inventory size, availability of alternative suppliers, the identity of
her downstream contracting partners (customers), and, in the case of
newer businesses her business plan.41

Their basic contention is that an aggrieved promisee may choose
not to reveal these economic variables in order to keep sensitive
business information confidential.42 This choice means that
expectation damages that are based on subjective, firm-specific
information are likely to be under-compensatory. Therefore, the
39 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (2013) (“Open Price Term”); id. § 2-309(1) (“The time
for shipment or delivery . . . if not . . . agreed upon shall be a reasonable time.”).
40 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698
(1933) (referring to post-breach events and in elegant terms observing that
“[e]xperience is then available to correct uncertain prophecy. Here is a book of wisdom
that courts may not neglect. We find no rule of law that sets a clasp upon its pages, and
forbids us to look within”); see also, e.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 552
(7th Cir. 1986) (stating that “we know of no case that suggests that a value based on
expectation of gain is more relevant and reliable than one derived from actual gain”).
41 Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law,
109 YALE L.J. 1885, 1886 (2000).
42 Id.
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promisor has an excellent chance of settling at a figure under
the actual lost profit. This, of course, assumes that the promisee
still has the incentive to sue. The implicit corollary to this socalled “secrecy interest” of the promisee is that this information
is not otherwise readily accessible to the promisor. How then can
the promisor price his breach to determine whether it would be
more efficient than performance? Taking these observations into
consideration, it seems evident that he cannot.
2. The Myth that Expectation Damages Fully Protect
Contractual Entitlements
This article now explores how a variety of aspects affect
full compensation notions. It establishes the robust support for
the idea that the aggrieved party is almost never put in the
same position as it would have been had the contract been
performed. It also shows that this failure to achieve the stated
objective of contract remedies is a result of longstanding
remedial judicial practices. In so doing, this section considers
the high costs of litigation, the refusal of courts to award
damages for non-pecuniary harms, the judicial treatment of
interest and the value of money, the accepted burden of proof
for actual damages, and the remedial rules of foreseeability
and proportionality.
a. Interest and the Value of Money
Whatever the historical reasons for its evolution, the
muddled judicial and legislative responses to interest awards
and the fluctuating value of money tend to undercut the
normative goal of full compensation.43 Although interest and
monetary value are separate remedial concerns, for at least one
reason that will soon be explained, their implications should be
jointly considered.
Even if we make the unrealistic assumption that
judgments are paid on the day they are rendered,44 there
43 The story of interest begins in Biblical times, when it was viewed as
suspicious at best and sinful at worst. For an overview of interest in its historical
context, see Martin Oyos, Comment, Prejudgment Interest in South Dakota, 33 S.D. L.
REV. 484, 485-88 (1988); see also John C. Keir & Robin C. Keir, Opportunity Cost: A
Measure of Prejudgment Interest, 39 BUS. LAW. 129, 131 (1983) (noting that the
“ancient and medieval prejudices against the charging of interest” influence the
current approach to prejudgment interest).
44 It is because this assumption does not accord with reality that judgment
interest is granted by statute in all jurisdictions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2516 (2000); VA. CODE
ANN. § 6.2-302 (2010). Despite the indispensability of this ingredient to making the plaintiff
whole, this article does not directly consider judgment interest or, for that matter, any of the
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remains the often lengthy period between the date of breach and
the date of judgment, as lawsuits are not filed immediately and
litigation takes time. Without prejudgment interest, the
aggrieved party is denied compensation for the lost opportunity
to invest monies that became rightfully hers when the damages
were incurred.45 It is this focus on compensation that has led
some courts to conclude that prejudgment interest is not really
interest at all, but is instead a form of damages.46 Although
such a distinction may seem like mere semantics,47 calling the
award “damages” may have the beneficial effect of making
statutory restrictions on prejudgment interest irrelevant.48
In a careful summary of the state of the law on the
availability of prejudgment interest, Professor Michael S.
Knoll states:

practical difficulties encountered in collecting judgments. The question it seeks to answer is
whether the judgment, if paid directly, fully compensates the promisee.
45 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 50 (1935) (prejudgment interest is
“allowed by law as additional damages for loss of use of the money due as damages,
during the lapse of time since the accrual of the claim”). Moreover, prejudgment
interest provides a disincentive for defendant to delay litigation and prevents her from
being unjustly enriched at the plaintiff ’ s expense. The court in In re Pago Pago
Aircrash of Jan. 30, 1974, 525 F. Supp. 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1981), put it this way:
An individual who must litigate to recover damages should be placed in the
same position, when he recovers, as the individual who recovered the day he
suffered an injury. Otherwise the [defendant] benefits from denying liability
and continuing to litigate, while he retains the use of money to which the
plaintiff is entitled, and the plaintiff is deprived of the benefit he should have
derived from an immediate recovery.
Id. at 1014.

46 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.5 (1973) (“Sometimes courts
emphasize the distinction between judgment and pre-judgment interest by saying that
pre-judgment interest is really a form of damages, while judgment interest is interest
as such, or interest eo nomine.”).
47 See, e.g., The Manhattan, 85 F.2d 427, 429 (3d Cir. 1936) (noting that “[t]he
difference between loss and interest thus becomes little more than a difference in words”).
48 See, e.g., Frank B. Bozzo, Inc., v. Elec. Weld Div. of the Fort Pitt Div. of
Spang Indus., 498 A.2d 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). The Pennsylvania Superior Court
was called upon to decide whether a buyer was entitled to have tacked on to its
judgment, interest from the date on which the sales contract was breached. The seller
contended that such recovery was unavailable where the amount of damages
occasioned by the breach was, before judgment, neither liquidated nor ascertainable.
The court disagreed. In its opinion, the award was not interest but rather
“compensation for delay” measured by the legal rate of interest. Id. at 899. As such, it
is an appropriate item of incidental damages under section 2-715. The court offered the
illustration of a buyer unable to earn interest on money that had to be spent to meet
the expenses incident to the seller’s breach. Id. at 898. It is interesting to note that the
New York Law Revision Commission objected to the inclusion of the phrase “damages
from delay or otherwise resulting from the breach” in section 2-715 in order to prevent
this form of delay damages from being classed as “incidental.” See AM. LAW INST.,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 81 (1957) (at “Reason”).
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[T]he requirement that a losing defendant pay prejudgment interest
to a successful plaintiff remains far from universal. Although a
growing number of jurisdictions recognize a successful plaintiff’ s
entitlement to prejudgment interest, other jurisdictions expressly
bar recovery. Still other courts and statutes leave it to the discretion
of the court whether to provide prejudgment interest. Frequently,
within a jurisdiction, the availability of prejudgment interest
depends on the source of the claim and the nature of the injury. For
example, in California a successful plaintiff whose claim is for a
certain amount (liquidated) or an amount capable of being made
certain by calculation (clearly ascertainable) is entitled to
prejudgment interest.49

In short, despite the premise that prejudgment interest is a
necessary part of compensation, it is clear that the outcome of
prejudgment interest analysis varies by jurisdiction and is not
uniform, certain, or rational.50 Moreover, consistency is also
lacking on the issue of when to begin the prejudgment period.
In a state such as Nevada, where interest starts to accrue when
the summons and complaint are served, under-compensation is
the inevitable result.51
Furthermore, under the present law, most courts award
prejudgment interest based on a simple interest calculation.52
However, to ensure that the plaintiff is fully compensated and
that the defendant is not unduly enriched, interest needs to be
compounded.53 The financial effects of the choice of interest
49 Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293,
297 (1996) (citations omitted).
50 For example, in a jurisdiction that draws a distinction between liquidated
or reasonably ascertainable damages and unliquidated damages, a court might permit
prejudgment interest on an award to a buyer of market damages under U.C.C. section
2-713 or cover damages under U.C.C. section 2-712, yet deny that same buyer interest
on lost profit damages under U.C.C. section 2-715. This type of inconsistency is
indefensible. See, e.g., Funkhouser v. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163, 168 (1933) (“It has
been recognized that a distinction, in this respect, simply as between cases of
liquidated and unliquidated damages, is not a sound one.”); Alaska v. Phillips, 470 P.2d
266, 273 (Alaska 1970) (“[T]he liquidated-unliquidated common law distinction lacks a
persuasive rationale.”).
51 Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.130(2) (1987) (“[T]he judgment draws
interest from the time of service of the summons and complaint . . . .”), with, TEX. FIN.
CODE ANN. § 304.005(a) (West 1999) (“[P]ostjudgment interest on a money judgment of
a court in this state accrues during the period beginning on the date the judgment is
rendered and ending on the date the judgment is satisfied.”).
52 DOBBS, supra note 46, at 354 (observing that simple interest appears to be
the majority rule).
53 See Knoll, supra note 49, at 306 (noting that “the difference between
compound and simple interest is that with the former, interest earned in the past
generates current interest, whereas with the latter, past interest never generates
current interest”). Professor Knoll explains further:

Conceptually, the proper way to calculate prejudgment interest is to use the
compound interest formulation. Compound interest is required because
prejudgment interest is not paid to the plaintiff as it accrues, but is retained
by the defendant until the judgment is enforced. Thus, each period the
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computation can be significant. In fact, Professor Knoll in his
article on prejudgment interest characterizes his suggestion
that interest be compounded as, “if not the most significant, at
least one of the most significant, in terms of dollars.”54
Even if interest were compounded, full compensation
would still elude the plaintiff if the chosen rate were not
appropriate. Whether the rate is unalterably fixed by statute55 or
is partially within the discretion of the judge or jury subject to a
statutory ceiling,56 the effects of the rate in terms of
compensation are intertwined not only with the rate of return
generally available to the plaintiff, but also the fluctuation in
money values. Unless the rate is thoughtfully analyzed to
address the former, and disengaged conceptually from the latter,
the plaintiff would not be in the same position she would have
been in if the damages were paid in full at the time of breach.
First, if the goal is to correctly calculate the rate of interest
that the plaintiff could have earned, how can a rate fixed by
statute be an accurate gauge? At times of low market interest
rates, a statutory rate will overcompensate, and at times of high
money costs, the same rate will undercompensate.57 Fixed
statutory rates also have the disadvantage that changes are
subject to legislative priorities and time tables.58 They are thus
unresponsive to actual market variations.59
The second, and perhaps more important, complication to
statutory or even market-based rates is that they fail to account
for the loss in dollar value due to inflation. Although the law of
damages assumes that a dollar’s buying power remains
constant, one need only have a conversation with one’s
grandparents to discover that this is quite clearly not the case.
The point was well made by Lord Justice Omrod of the Court of
Appeal in William Cory & Son Ltd. v. Wingate Investments Ltd:60
defendant’s obligation to the plaintiff increases. Compound interest accounts
for this effect.
Id. at 307. Another way to think about the method of interest computation is to ask
what type of interest arrangement would have been available to plaintiff, had she
invested the amount of damages at the time of breach. Since most financial institutions
commonly compound interest, this method is necessary to assure full compensation. Id.
54 Id. at 308.
55 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-104 (2014).
56 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 549.09 (2010).
57 See John Y. Gotanda, When Recessions Create Windfalls: The Problems of
Using Domestic Law to Fix Interest Rates Under Article 78 CISG, 13 VINDOBONA J.
INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 229 , 238-39 (2009).
58 Id. at 231.
59 Id. at 230.
60 William Cory & Son Ltd. v. Wingate Invs. (London Colney) Ltd., [1980] 17
Build. L.R. 114 (Eng.), 1980 WL 619053 (click “Official Transcript”).
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It is clear that the defendants have had the use of this money ever
since the date when they became liable to compensate the plaintiffs for
breach of contract. It does not stop there. If the damages in this case
are to be assessed at 1972 or 1973 pounds, the defendants will save an
enormous amount because they will be able to pay a debt due in 1972
in 1980 pounds, which is not reasonable, equitable or just.61

Even if the prejudgment interest rate were tied to a
market rate, this would have no effect on the compensation
consequences of fluctuations in money value. A market rate is
largely composed of two elements.62 One is the “real interest
rate,” or cost of money.63 The other is compensation for erosion of
money values caused by the lender’s anticipation of future
inflation.64 Thus, a market interest rate reflects an estimate of
future inflation while prejudgment compensation should account
for past inflation, so that application of the current rate is not
the answer.65 The Law Reform Commission of the Canadian
Province of Manitoba, in its 1982 report, wisely recommended
that courts multiply the real rate of interest by the time
elapsed, to which the percentage change in an appropriate
price index should be added to compensate for the lost
purchasing power of money.66
Full acceptance of all this does not compel a particular
approach. It compels only the abandonment of the fiction that
the award of prejudgment interest ensures that the promisee
will be in the same position she would have been in had the
promisor paid an amount equal to the judgment at the time the
breach or loss occurred.

Id. at 109.
Rolando F. Peláez, Higgledy-Piggledy Awards for Lost Earnings, 36
JURIMETRICS J. 325, 326 n.7 (1996).
63 Real Interest Rate Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/r/realinterestrate.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
64 Jay Kaplan, Unit 6—Inflation and Economic Growth, PRINCIPLES OF
MACROECONOMICS (June 2002), http://www.colorado.edu/economics/courses/econ2020/
section6/section6-main.html.
65 As one commentator observed, the current rate is not even a reliable
barometer of existing and future rates of inflation:
61

62

[C]entral bank and related rates of interest simply have not been, as Professor
Waddams (and indeed other transatlantic writers) seem to suppose, so
calculated as to compensate a lender for actual or prospective rates of inflation.
Thus in 1974-75 in the United Kingdom with then current rates of inflation
well in excess of 20 per cent., bank rates never rose above 12 3/4 per cent.
I. N. Duncan Wallace, Inflation and Assessment of Construction Cost Damages, 98 LAW
Q. REV. 406, 409-10 (1982).
66 See
MANITOBA LAW REFORM COMM’N REPORT ON PREJUDGMENT
COMPENSATION MONEY AWARDS, REPORT NO. 47, at 74-76 (Jan. 4, 1982), available at
http://manitobalawreform.ca/pubs/pdf/archives/47-full_report.pdf.
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b. The Price of Litigation and Associated Costs
Under an expectation damages regime, the cost of
litigation can be a deterrent to pursuing any recovery, which
could in turn incentivize breach and disincentivize market
participation. A major expense of the litigation system is its
transaction costs. Evaluating the extent to which a promisee is
compensated for the full cost of the breach requires
consideration of not only the amount of damages awarded at the
final stage of the litigation process, but also the costs of
obtaining that award.67 The general rule in the United States is
that, in the absence of a statute or contractual provision to the
contrary, the prevailing party in litigation is solely responsible
for her attorneys’ fees.68 It should be noted that U.C.C. section
2-715, providing for the recovery of consequential damages, is
not a statutory exception to this general rule.69
Whether the fee is an hourly rate, contingent fee, or
some combination of the two, the amount is by no means
trivial. As an example of what a contract plaintiff might expect
to pay, consider the following explanation taken from one law
firm’s website:
When is a contingency fee a bad idea If you have a very strong case
and you can afford to pay hourly for legal services, then a
contingency fee may not be the best option. If you have a strong
breach of contract claim for $60,000, it may cost you $5000 to litigate
the case on an hourly basis and recover the money. If you can afford
to pay the $5000, this may be a better option than paying a $20,000
contingency fee. When you do this, you are taking the risk of
advancing the money, and you are taking the risk that you might
pay for legal fees and still lose the case. If the case[ ] is strong, that
[may] be a worthwhile risk to save money on attorney’s fees.70

One can assume that this grim cost picture is not atypical.
Even statutes or court rules that permit the prevailing party to
recover her costs do not lessen the burden of litigation costs, as
67 For two reasons, this article ignores the real-world fact that most breach of
contract cases are settled, not tried. The first is the lack of available data resulting from
private nature of the settlement process. Second, settlement negotiations take place in
the “shadow” of the law. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979). One would,
therefore, expect these private negotiations to be based on what would be a proper
resolution at trial.
68 See generally DOBBS, supra note 46, at § 3.10(3).
69 See, e.g., Ind. Glass Co. v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 692 N.E.2d 886, 888 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1998).
70 Eric Parker, Understanding Contingency Fees, STOTIS & BAIRD CHARTERED
(Mar. 6, 2009, 11:30 AM), http://www.stotis-baird.com/library/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=69&Itemid=55.
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these “costs” do not include attorneys’ fees.71 Instead, they permit
recovery of fees of the clerk of court, the marshal or sheriff, docket
fees and like sums, which can vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.72 Compared with outlays such as attorneys’ fees,
recoverable costs tend to be small sums.73
From a compensation viewpoint, one problem with the
contract law system is that courts are reluctant to permit
recovery for non-pecuniary losses.74 These are losses that are
not susceptible to measurement in purely economic terms, such
as mental suffering, inconvenience, loss of time, or humiliation.75
One might take the position that two general categories of nonpecuniary damage claims may arise in breach of contract cases.
First, there are claims for some type of psychological harm.
These are the so-called “emotional distress” cases, regardless of
what other descriptive label a court or litigant may choose to
employ.76 Perhaps the term “psychic harm” is the more
appropriate characterization, and might better serve as a new
and useful grouping of these cases, in which judges would
strive for consistency and litigants would feel empowered to look
for precedent. Instead, psychic harm currently does not seem to
be a recognized category and is simply a feature common to
many cases bearing different labels.
Second are the so-called claims for lost time. The
distinguishing feature of these claims is their temporal, not
psychic, nature. For some definite period of time, the aggrieved
party has lost the opportunity to engage in an alternative
activity—it is in this opportunistic sense that time has been
lost. Thus, notwithstanding the old saying that “time is
money,” the aggrieved party cannot expect to be compensated
for what could be a considerable number of hours spent
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d).
See DOBBS, supra note 46, at § 3.10.
73 Id.
74 See John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions
Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 1565, 1571-72 (1986).
75 See id. at 1578. (“Nonpecuniary losses, such as inconvenience, annoyance, and
emotional distress, although likely real in many situations, are rarely recognized.” (internal
citation omitted)). The most prominent exception involves the right of the aggrieved party to
recover damages for emotional distress. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 353 (1981) (“Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also
caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional
disturbance was a particularly likely result.”). Typically, emotional distress damages are
only awarded in death and burial cases, in cases where the breach is accompanied by public
embarrassment of the plaintiff or in cases where the breach results in physical harm to the
plaintiff, as in contracts for medical services. See Sebert, at 1585; see also Douglas J.
Whaley, Paying for the Agony: the Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages in Contract
Actions, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935 (1992).
76 See Sebert, supra note 74, at 1568.
71
72
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investigating and preparing for trial. Even in those instances
where the economic value of the time lost is easily monetized
(e.g., employees are diverted from their normal tasks to
prepare as witnesses), the expense is not recoverable as an
item of damages.
c. The Problem of Measurement
Frequently, courts have stated that if the plaintiff fails to
prove his damages “with reasonable certainty,” all recovery is
denied.77 This all-or-nothing approach is notoriously draconian
and is frequently criticized.78 Yet, the rule against the recovery
of speculative damages will no doubt continue to serve a
legitimating function.79 For example, courts have asserted that
the profits lost by a new business are too speculative to permit
their recovery.80 This is especially true for those cases, such as
77 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (“Damages are not
recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with
reasonable certainty.”); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1 (2d ed. 1993) (“When
the plaintiff ’ s proof fails to show the amount of damages with adequate certainty,
courts usually deny the damages claim if the case is the kind in which plaintiffs
generally would be able to quantify damages.”). The only Code reference to this
limitation appears in Comment 4 to section 2-715, which reads as follows:

The burden of proving the extent of loss incurred by way of consequential
damage is on the buyer, but the section on liberal administration of remedies
rejects any doctrine of certainty which requires almost mathematical
precision in the proof of loss. Loss may be determined in any manner which is
reasonable under the circumstances.
U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 4 (2013) .
The effect of this reasonable certainty requirement is “to increase the
injured party’s burden of persuasion well beyond the usual one of making out his case
by the ‘preponderance or greater weight of the evidence.’” E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal
Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1210-11 (1970).
78 See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 77, at 1214-15 (the certainty rule imposes
“the Draconian choice of all or nothing” and “it is hard to defend a requirement that
attempts to cope with the necessity for speculation by denying recovery altogether
rather than by resorting to reasonable approximation”). Also, this rule has an ironic
implication worth noting. Although its justification is to prevent overcompensation, it
may, on occasion, do just the opposite. Once damages are proved with reasonable
certainty, no discount rate is employed to take into account the reality that future
financial projections always lack absolute certainty.
79 In many respects, damages assessments in tort are much less exacting.
Perhaps the most extreme example of an accepted damage assessment for which no
certain metric exists is the pain and suffering award. See Beagle v. Vasold, 417 P.2d
673, 681 (Cal. 1966) (“Every case which has considered the issue [of pain and suffering]
has emphasized the difficulty faced by a jury in attempting to measure in monetary
terms compensation for injuries as subjective as pain. . . .”).
80 See DOBBS, supra note 46, at 154-55. Although proving probable losses is
no easy matter for a business without a track record, according to at least some courts
it may be possible to establish a sufficient factual basis for an award “with the aid of
expert testimony, economic and financial data, market surveys and analyses, business
records of similar enterprises, and the like.” AGF, Inc. v. Great Lakes Heat Treating
Co., 555 N.E.2d 634, 638 (Ohio 1990) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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MindGames Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co.,81 in which the business
activity is in some way idiosyncratic. In MindGames, the
plaintiff failed to establish the amount of lost future profits
resulting from the defendant’s failure to adequately promote a
new board game invented by the plaintiff.82 Moreover, the court
went so far as to characterize the new business exemption as a
“rule” that prevents recovery even where the evidence would
otherwise be sufficient to project future profits.83
For this same reason of inherently uncertain proof,
many courts have denied recovery for loss of goodwill.84 Yet, try
to tell a buyer of goods for resale that the market price-contract
price formula puts her in as good a position as if the seller had
performed when resold goods are being returned as defective by
angry sub-buyers who are taking their business elsewhere.
Notwithstanding this undeniably real loss to the buyer, it is not
a liability concern for the seller. This serves to further
illustrate why overcompensation is unlikely to present a
realistic problem in a variety of cases.
d. The Rules of Foreseeability and Proportionality
why

Thus far, this article has identified some of the reasons
contract plaintiffs are routinely undercompensated

§ 352 cmt. b). The plaintiff ’ s proof, however, was insufficient in Great Lakes. Id. Profits
are even more difficult to prove in those cases where a new business is contemplated by
the plaintiff, but the defendant’s breach prevents its formation. See, e.g., Coastland
Corp. v. Third Nat’l Mortg. Co., 611 F.2d 969, 977-78 (4th Cir. 1979); Karilyn E. Kober,
Comment, A Case for Recovery: Damages for Lost Profits of an Unestablished Business,
12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1081 (1979).
81 MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
82 Id. at 658-59.
83 Id. at 654.
84 Consider, for example, a party’s loss of future profits due to customer
dissatisfaction as a result of the breach. See, e.g., Lifeguard Indus., Inc. v. Ambrose, 42
B.R. 734, 740 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). But see Delano Growers’ Coop. Winery v. Supreme
Wine Co., 473 N.E.2d 1066, 1077 (Mass. 1985). There, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court stated that lost goodwill was a recoverable item of consequential damages
under U.C.C. section 2-715 and concluded that the loss had been proved with sufficient
specificity; see also Robert P. Barbarowicz, Comment, Loss of Goodwill and Business
Reputation as Recoverable Elements of Damages Under Uniform Commercial Code § 2715—The Pennsylvania Experience, 75 DICK. L. REV 63 (1970). A reasonable definition of
what is meant by goodwill is the following:
The good will of a business is the reasonable expectation of its continued
profitable operation. Many factors are involved: the name of the firm, its
reputation for doing business, the location, the number and character of its
customers, the former success of the business, and many other elements
which would be advantageous in the operation of the business. Good will is a
property right which may be sold.
Young v. Cooper, 203 S.W.2d 376, 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947), quoted in Agric. Servs.
Ass’n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1071 (6th Cir. 1977).
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without relying at all on the notorious rule of foreseeability laid
down by the Hadley court.85 But here is where it comes in to
supplement the picture of under-compensation. For those
readers who are unfamiliar with the facts in Hadley, they can
be simply stated. A miller contracted with a carrier to deliver a
broken crankshaft to the repair shop.86 Unfortunately, the
carrier was delayed and the miller was forced to shut down for
the period of the delay.87 The miller then sought to recover the
profits lost during the delay.88 The court stated:
Where two parties have made a contract, which one of them has
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in
respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and
reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to
the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as
the probable result of the breach of it.89

One way in which courts and commentators have sought
to operationalize the holding in Hadley is to distinguish between
general or direct damages on the one hand and consequential or
special damages on the other.90 Although drawing this
distinction can be a bit murky at times,91 it is helpful to think
of the former category as encompassing those losses that are
tied directly to the value of what was promised and are not
dependent upon the aggrieved party’s particular circumstances
or position. The harm is, therefore, presumed to be foreseeable
and no specific proof of foreseeability is needed.92 A good
example is the cover damages formula in U.C.C. section 2-712.93
A recovery under this section is directly related to the deficiency
85
86
87
88
89

Hadley v. Baxendale, [1854] 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex.).
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id.
Id.; See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981):

(1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have
reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was
made. (2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it
follows from the breach (a) in the ordinary course of events, or (b) as a result
of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the party
in breach had reason to know.
For the U.C.C.’s formulation of the Hadley rule, see supra note 12.
90 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. b (1981).
91 For a discussion of some competing meanings, see David W. Barnes &
Deborah Zalesne, The Shadow Code, 56 S.C. L. REV. 93, 99-101 (2004); see also Jeffrey
R. Cagle, et al., Comment, The Classification of General and Special Damages for
Pleading Purposes in Texas, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 629 (1999).
92 See DOBBS, supra note 46, at § 12.1(1).
93 U.C.C. § 2-712 (2013).
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in the seller’s performance (i.e., non-delivery) and has nothing to
do with the specific buyer’s situation.94 This is not the case with
consequential damages. Consider a buyer who anticipates
reselling the goods at a profit. When the seller does not deliver,
the buyer is unable to enter into anticipated resale contracts.
She then sues the seller for lost profits under U.C.C. section 2715(2)(a.). In order to obtain these lost profits, the buyer will
have to show that the harm was foreseen or foreseeable,
because not all buyers purchase goods for resale.95 It would be
unreasonable to expect sellers to make that assumption
without knowing more about the buyer’s situation or intention.
When it comes to recovering consequential damages, a
great deal is at stake: these damages have the potential to
greatly exceed direct damages and may be many times higher
than the amount the aggrieved party agreed to pay for the
breaching party’s performance. In this legal environment,
commercial parties can (and often do) seek to control their risk
through clauses that limit or exclude liability for consequential
damages.96 The important lesson from Hadley, however, is that
the aggrieved party may be foreclosed from recovering
consequential damages even where there is no contractual
provision alerting her to that fact.
Even in those cases where the foreseeability test is
satisfied and no contractual provision precludes recovery of
consequential damages,97 there is no reason to believe that
courts will award foreseeable damages in an unforeseeable
amount. Although it is commonly asserted that the magnitude of
the loss is not a disqualifying factor in the aggrieved party’s
See id.
Unlike general damages, consequential damages (e.g., lost profits) often
compensate for a loss of value that the aggrieved party anticipated receiving from a
third party. As one court explained:
94
95

[C]onsequential damages do not arise within the scope of the immediate
buyer-seller transaction, but rather stem from losses incurred by the nonbreaching party in its dealings, often with third parties, which were a
proximate result of the breach, and which were reasonably foreseeable by the
breaching party at the time of contracting.
Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., Petrobras v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 372 F. Supp. 503, 508
(E.D.N.Y. 1974).
96 For example, U.C.C. section 2-719(3) expressly sanctions such a clause,
provided it is not unconscionable.
97 This article ignores the effect that the mitigation doctrine may have on the
recovery rights of the aggrieved party because, at least in theory, the loss is a product
of the aggrieved party’s own inaction or neglect. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 350 (1981) (setting forth the rule that “damages are not recoverable for
loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or
humiliation”); see also U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (precluding the recovery of consequential
damages if those damages could have been prevented by “cover or otherwise”).
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recovery,98 the behavior of courts and inconsistent statements of
commentators leaves one baffled about the actual outcome in a
given case.99 Moreover, a rule against “disproportionate
compensation” is now enshrined in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts.100 The following illustration is provided to help us to
understand what the drafters had in mind:
A, a retail hardware dealer, contracts to sell B an inexpensive lighting
attachment, which, as A knows, B needs in order to use his tractor at
night on his farm. A is delayed in obtaining the attachment and, since
no substitute is available, B is unable to use the tractor at night
during the delay. In an action by B against A for breach of contract,
the court may, after taking into consideration such factors as the
absence of an elaborate written contract and the extreme
disproportion between B’s loss of profits during the delay and the price
of the attachment, exclude recovery for loss of profits.101

Therefore, each one of the analytical steps towards the recovery
of consequential damages can be a complicated affair involving
complicated decisions. Each step raises the possibility that the
system will deny compensation when there has been a
compensable loss.
High
litigation
costs,
non-pecuniary
damages,
unavailable or inadequate prejudgment interest compensation,
the problem of measurement, and the rules of foreseeability and
proportionality all make the legal remedy of damages an
unreasonable alternative to contract performance. Having
identified these practical difficulties, the next section will lay
bare the mythical belief that overcompensation concerns justify
judicial negation of the buyer’s choice of remedy.

98 See, e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 825 (3d ed. 1999) (“The
magnitude of the loss need not have been foreseeable, and a party is not disadvantaged
by its failure to disclose the profits that it expected to make from the contract.”);
Barnard v. Compugraphic Corp., 667 P.2d 117, 120 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
plaintiffs are not to be denied recovery because the amount of damage cannot be
determined); Wroth v. Tyler, [1974] Ch. 30 at 61 (holding that a plaintiff “need show
only a contemplation of circumstances which embrace the head or type of damage in
question, and need not demonstrate a contemplation of the quantum of damages under
that head or type”).
99 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, at 250 (lost profit cannot be
recovered “to the extent that it is extraordinary”); Taylor & Gaskin, Inc. v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 732 F.2d 1273, 1280 (6th Cir. 1984); Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v.
Newman Indus. Ltd., [1949] 2 K.B. 528 (U.K.) (holding that, in regard to the buyer’s
lost profits on dying contracts, that even if a type of loss is reasonably foreseeable, the
plaintiff can recover only that amount of loss that was reasonably foreseeable).
100 Stated as: “(3) A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding
recovery for loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or
ot[h]erwise if it concludes that in t[h]e circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid
disproportionate compensation.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351.
101 Id. at § 351, illus. 18.
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THE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE THE MARKET MEASURE OF
DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 2-713

From a compensation viewpoint, the problem with section
2-713 is not that it overcompensates or undercompensates
aggrieved buyers. Its principle shortcoming, according to its
critics, seems to be that the market price minus contract price
formula lacks any relevant relation to the buyer’s actual
damages.102 However, as discussed above, the contract liability
system operates in such a manner that in the average run of
cases, only a fraction of losses caused by actionable breach will
ever be paid by the breacher. In fact, there are so many legal
barriers to full compensation that only as an act of hyperbole can
it be said that damages recovered in contract litigation put the
injured party in as good a position as if the contract had been
performed. The gap between the losses suffered and the contract
liability system’s contribution to paying these losses strongly
suggests that we stop assuming that the traditional approach to
expectation damages is a standard of perfect compensation.
Instead, the buyer should have the option to choose her form of
recovery. This section will look at three issues concerning the
application of section 2-713 in a more realistic context.
A.

Should the Buyer’s Actual Lost Profits be Permitted as a
Defense to a Section 2-713 Claim?

Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., is a
good example of one court’s struggle with the question of
whether a buyer should be awarded market damages even
though that amount exceeded its lost profits.103 In Allied, a
packing company (Packer) contracted to sell raisins to an
exporter (Exporter) at a fixed price.104 Exporter had entered into
two fixed-price resale contracts.105 Before delivery, the raisin
crop was adversely affected by rains, thus causing an increase in
market price. Packer was unable to obtain raisins from its
supplier and breached its contract with Exporter.106 Exporter did
not cover, but managed to have one of the resale contracts
rescinded.107 Although the other resale buyer demanded delivery,
102 See, e.g., Childres, supra note 2, at 837 (asserting that “section 2-713 fails because
it is a hypothetical remedy; it lacks any relevant relation to damages actually suffered”).
103 Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d 905,
912 (Ct. App. 1984).
104 Id. at 907.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 908-09.
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no suit was filed against Exporter, nor did Exporter ever pay
any damages.108 Thus, Exporter’s “actual” loss was
approximately $4400, namely, its lost profits on the two resale
contracts.109 Exporter sued Packer for approximately $150,000,
which was the market-contract price differential under section
2-713.110 The court limited Exporter’s recovery to its expected
resale profit of approximately $4400.111 In deciding this case, the
court relied primarily on the policy, now expressed in U.C.C.
section 1-305, that an award of damages should compensate for
no more than the aggrieved party’s actual loss.112
Allied Canners supplies the conventional account for
why market damages should be reduced to the buyer’s lost
profit: the general standard of compensation found in section 1305 caps any recovery under the Code’s more specific
provisions.113 Though there is undeniable power to this account,
there is considerably more to this story.114
First, the fact that there is a considerable difference in
amount between market damages and the profit the buyer
would have earned on its resale contracts is a wholly
inadequate basis for determining whether the buyer would
realize a windfall if permitted to recover the former. When, for
example, the buyer’s litigation costs are factored in, it is quite
possible that they may add an amount about equal to or even
Id. at 909.
Id. at 909-10.
110 Id. at 910.
111 Id. at 915 & n.8.
112 Id. at 915; U.C.C. § 1-305 (2013). The court’s conclusion regarding an
aggrieved buyer may apply with equal force to the disappointed seller. See, e.g., Nobs
Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 214-16 (5th Cir. 1980) (restricting
seller to its recovery of lost profits under section 2-708(2) where seller’s lost profits
were less than its market damages).
113 Another case limiting the buyer to its lost profit where the buyer had
already contracted to sell the goods is H-W-H Cattle Co., Inc. v. Schroeder, 767 F.2d
437 (8th Cir. 1985). But see TexPar Energy, Inc. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 45 F.3d 1111
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the more specific measure of damages found in section 2713 should prevail over the more general remedial policy expressed in section [1-305]).
Professors Simon and Novack describe the competing judicial viewpoints on this issue
as follows: “Strangely enough, each view has generally tended to disregard the
arguments, and even the existence, of the opposing view. These two rival bodies of law,
imposing in appearance, have passed each other like silent ships in the night.” David
Simon & Gerald A. Novack, Limiting the Buyer’s Market Damages to Lost Profits: A
Challenge to the Enforceability of Market Contracts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1397 (1979)
(internal citation omitted).
114 For one thing, even proponents of the position of the court in Allied
Canners would limit its application to situations where the buyer’s resale purchaser
will forego any claim it may have against the buyer. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
3, at 413 (concluding that the buyer’s damages should not be limited to the expected
resale profit where the resale purchaser is likely to insist upon performance, “for in
that case the buyer will be liable in damages to its own purchaser equal to the
difference between the buyer’s resale contract price and the market price”).
108
109
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greater than the dollar differences in recovery. In short, it
makes no sense to speak in terms of compensation without
data revealing the real costs (both economic and non-economic)
of carrying out the litigation. The conclusion reached in Allied
Canners lacks any of this real data.115 Thus, the court’s
ultimate determination fails to reach an outcome that
effectively considers the real position of the injured party.
Moreover, even if the myth of overcompensation is not
enough to compel the buyer’s freedom of choice in this area,
compensation law seeks to achieve other meaningful objectives
that are not as elusive as establishing actual losses. Among
these objectives are administrative efficiency and deterrence.116
The market measure of damages achieves administrative
efficiency because it will likely lower the cost of proof and
reduce the time of lawyers, litigants, juries, and other third
parties in the system. It achieves deterrence by facilitating the
calculation of risks.117 Sellers are discouraged from breaching
their contracts in the face of a rising market, in all cases in
which the buyer intends to resell, and from taking the chance
that the buyer’s damages will be small should the market drop.
In the latter case, the buyer should be free to opt for a lostprofit recovery as an alternative to market damages.118 This is
115
116

See Allied Canners & Packers, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 915.
Professors Simon and Novack have noted:

While it is generally recognized that the automatic invocation of market
damages may sometimes overcompensate the plaintiff, a variety of
arguments have been employed by commentators and courts to justify this
result: the desirability of maintaining a uniform rule and of facilitating
settlements; the public interest in encouraging contract performance and the
proper functioning of the market; the prevention of defendant’s unjust
enrichment; the restoration of the very “value” promised to plaintiff; and the
inherent difficulty and complexity of proving actual economic losses not
encompassed within the contract terms.
Simon & Novack, supra note 113, at 1403 (citations omitted).
117 Because this article has earlier questioned the factual underpinnings of the
efficient breach doctrine, see supra note 28 and accompanying text, this article does not
use a term that assumes that some breaches are efficient and others not. Instead, by
using the term “deterrence,” it treats all breaches equally and assumes that the
adherence to contractual obligations is efficient and should be encouraged.
118 Interestingly, Professors White and Summers recognize many of the
adverse consequences of limiting damages but believe them to be outweighed by the
idea of a lost-profit cap on the buyers-recovery.
We recognize that the prospect of a reduction in damages may have some
impact upon a seller’s willingness to perform, and may make the security of a
buyer’s expectations somewhat smaller than would otherwise be the case.
Arguably, too, our position will unjustly enrich an occasional seller and may
also make the trial more complicated. Even so, we think our overall position
is more faithful to the idea that the contract plaintiff should recover only his
lost expectancy.

200

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1

not to say that these advantages will exist in every case.
Rather, the advantages present in any given situation will
depend on the particular characteristics of the contract, the
market, and the parties. The aim here is to simply point out
that overcompensation should not be an overriding concern and
to identify some of the implications of this conclusion for the
normative question of whether buyers should be free to have
their damages measured under section 2-713.
B.

Should Post-Breach Events be Used to Limit the Buyer’s
Recovery Under Section 2-713?

Another matter regarding the application of section 2713 that warrants discussion is the effect of post-breach events
on the buyer’s right to choose a market-contract price measure
of damages.119 Consider, for example, the Allied Canners case,
but with changed facts: assume that Exporter had not yet
entered into the resale contracts at the time of Packer’s breach.
Packer breaches on the delivery date, when the market price is
above the contract price. Shortly thereafter, the market price
falls dramatically to below the price at which Exporter and
other wholesalers can sell raisins. If Packer had not breached,
Exporter would have lost money on resale.
The foregoing hypothetical forces us to face directly the
issue of whether post-breach circumstances should afford a
ground for rejecting a specific Code-dictated measure of damages
(here the difference between contract price and market price) in
order to award a sum that presumably reflects the aggrieved
party’s actual loss. Under the conventional perception,
overcompensation is assumed to be an ever-present risk that
should be scrupulously taken into account when computing the
plaintiff’s damages. However, the preceding discussion indicates
that this assumption may be false. Judges must consider this
reality in choosing the desirable measure of damages. It is
simply not enough to invoke a maxim or canon of statutory
construction, as one court did, and say that section 2-713 trumps
section 1-305 because it is the more specific provision.120 To be

WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 414. This is but another example of the grip that
the myth of full compensation has on the psyche of courts and commentators alike.
119 Some courts have been all too willing to assume the propriety of deciding
cases with ex post data. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
120 See Tongish v. Thomas, 840 P.2d 471, 474 (Kan. 1992) (“[B]ecause it appears
impractical to make [§ 1-305] and [§ 2-713] harmonize in this factual situation, [§ 2-713]
should prevail as the more specific statute according to rules of statutory construction.”).
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convincing, any decision must be grounded in reason and policy,
not on a premise that can be easily manipulated.121
In order to assess the merits of ignoring post-breach
events, it is necessary to break down the general issue into two
categories. These are: (1) the limiting effect, if any, of events
that occur after suit has been filed, and (2) the limiting effect, if
any, of events that occur post-breach, but before suit has been
filed. This distinction is necessary because the latter context
may invoke a policy concern that is not present in the former.
This part has suggested several potential advantages
that awarding damages based on a straightforward application
of section 2-713 may have over an approach that relies on
section 1-305 to limit damages to some lesser amount. It has
posited that actual overcompensation is unlikely and that
recovery under section 2-713 does more to deter breach and
promote administrative efficiency than would an award
compelled by the variations of future shifts in the market. Once
we recognize that the Allied Canners court erred in its
conclusion that the buyer’s so-called actual loss should be
determinative, it becomes apparent that permitting the buyer
to choose to recover under section 2-713 without regard to
events that occur after suit is filed is supported by those same
considerations that generally justify freedom of choice.
Moreover, if these later events were relevant, a principle of
finality demands that there come a point when they would no
longer be relevant. Exactly when would that point be reached?
When judgment is entered? When the trial ends? At some
earlier time? One is left to speculate.
Now consider the second temporal context in which later
events may arguably be a potentially limiting factor in the
buyer’s choice of remedy. Suppose that in the Allied Canners
hypothetical, the dramatic fall in market price occurred before
the buyer filed suit. In other words, instead of breathing a sigh
of relief that the seller chose not to perform and pecuniary losses
were avoided, the buyer ignores the post-breach event and
121 Indeed, Karl Llewellyn urged courts to decide cases in the Grand Style or
the Style of Reason. For him, that meant statutes should be read and implemented “in
accordance with their purpose and reason.” KARL N. LLEWELLYN, On the Current
Recapture of the Grand Tradition, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 215, 217 (1962). Another indication of Llewellyn’s belief that the underlying
purposes of the Code and its sections should guide decisionmaking is his views on the
canons of statutory construction. After noting that “there are two opposing canons on
almost every point,” he writes that “[p]lainly, to make any canon take hold in a
particular instance, the construction contended for must be sold, essentially by means
other than the use of the canon.” Karl N. Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS, app. at 521 (1960).
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demands compensation under section 2-713. What may call for a
different conclusion here regarding the application of that
section is that the non-recoverable costs of litigation (e.g.,
attorney’s fees) are essentially self-inflicted. After all, why file
suit if there was no actual pecuniary loss at that time?122
Even in this situation we should be reluctant to impose
restraints on market-based damages. Allowing recovery in such
a situation might be seen by some as devoid of any normative
component⎯or at least any normative component other than
penalizing the seller for its breach. However, that view widely
misses the mark. First, ignoring later events and their impact
on the buyer’s economic position fosters speedy and accurate
judgments that would provide the predictability and certainty
necessary for commercial transactions. Second, it would protect
the buyer’s right to receive the promised goods without
conveying an unfair advantage to the seller who seeks to
capitalize on a shifting market. The buyer should be entitled to
the value of the seller’s performance on the date set for that
performance, regardless of what transpires afterwards.123 In
the hypothetical presented, it would seem wrong to excuse the
seller’s breach for the fortuitous reason that the buyer had not
yet entered into resale contracts. More than a century ago,
Sedgwick, in his treatise on damages, resisted whatever allure
there might be for fixing compensation based on post-breach
events. He argued for an award of market damages regardless
of whether the buyer subsequently “keeps, sells, gives away, or
destroys the goods.”124 Ignoring post-breach events in the
122 But how can we be sure that the buyer was able to, and did in fact, accurately
assess its damages situation prior to filing suit? It may very well be that the facts indicating
that there was no loss were first developed and came to light post-suit. In such a case it
would be unfair to characterize the non-recoverable litigation costs as “self-inflicted.”
123 For an analogous situation, consider a buyer who covers at a price higher
than the contract price at a time when it has entered into a “cost plus” contract to
resell the goods. If the buyer can, therefore, pass its increased cost on to its sub-buyer
should that deprive the buyer of its cover damages under section 2-712? According to at
least one court the answer is no. See KGM Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 286, 376, 36 Cal. App. 4th 376, 389 (1995) (explaining that permitting the
buyer to recover under section 2-712 “gives the buyer the benefit of its bargain. What
the buyer chooses to do with that bargain is not relevant to the determination of
damages under section 2[-]712”).
124 3 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 855,
at 1770 (9th ed. 1920). Simon and Novack offer an argument along these lines,
developing a more elaborate, formalized version of a betting explanation:

[W]here both parties to a market transaction are . . . dealing with
commodities of fluctuating value, the contract should be treated as equivalent
to a bet which the parties are making against the future market price.
Payment of market damages amounts to specific performance of the bet.
Since a functioning futures market is predicated on a system of enforceable
bets against the future, “specific performance” of those bets—through
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calculation of damages has the advantages of deterring breach,
and can provide finality and predictability to parties entering
into a contract.
C.

Should a Buyer Who Purchased Replacement Goods be
Permitted to Recover Contract/Market Damages Under
Section 2-713?

There has been persistent debate over whether an
aggrieved buyer who has covered under section 2-712 by
purchasing substitute goods elsewhere should be permitted to
recover market-based damages in those situations where the
applicable market price exceeds the cover price.125 Consider, for
example, a contract for the sale of 100 cases of widgets for a
price of $10.00 per case. At the time of the seller’s failure to
deliver, the market value of the widgets is $11.00 per case, but
it soon declines to $10.50 per case. The aggrieved buyer
purchases substitute widgets for the then market price of
$10.50, but chooses to sue to recover the difference between the
contract price of $10.00 and the market value of $11.00 at the
time she learned of the breach.
One view, put forward by Ellen Peters, is that the
buyer has an unfettered choice between damages based on the

payment of market damages—can be viewed as fundamental to the continued
existence of the market itself.
Simon & Novack, supra note 113, at 1436-37.
125 On the seller’s side, the analogous case is one in which a seller who is not a
“lost volume” seller seeks to recover damages measured by the contract-market
differential under section 2-708(1) notwithstanding its resale to a third-party under
section 2-706. On this issue, too, debate rages. For two examples of contrary viewpoints,
see Peters, supra note 3, at 260 (concluding that the history of the UCC, including
deletion of language prefacing a seller’s right to recover damages for nonacceptance with
“‘so far as any goods have not been resold,’” clarified that an aggrieved seller was not
required to elect between damages under Section 2-706 and Section 2-708 and “indicates
a purpose to safeguard alternative remedies”) and WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at
478 (“We conclude that a seller should not be permitted to recover more under 2-708(1)
than under 2-706, but we admit we are swimming upstream against a heavy current of
implication which flows from the comments and the Code history.”).
Another analogous case is that of an aggrieved lessee who elects to cover
and then sues to recover more under a market-based measure. In this instance the
drafters of Article 2A have spoken. Section 2A-519(1) provides that market-based
damages are available only if “a lessee elects not to cover or a lessee elects to cover and
the cover is by a lease agreement that for any reason does not qualify for treatment
under [the cover provision], or is by purchase or otherwise.” U.C.C. § 2A-519(1) (2013).
If the contract is governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (the CISG) there can be no debate regarding the issue. The
CISG makes it clear that an aggrieved party (buyer or seller) may only recover the
difference between the contract price and the current price if she has not covered by
purchase or resale. CISG art. 76(1) (2010).
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cost of cover or on the market value of the goods.126 In so
concluding, she strives to achieve a parity of treatment for both
buyers and sellers. The key U.C.C. provision for her is section
2-703, which provides a list of alternative remedies available to
the seller, suggesting that the seller always has the choice of
which remedy to pursue. Comment 1 reinforces this
interpretation by providing: “This Article rejects any doctrine
of election of remedy as a fundamental policy and thus the
remedies are essentially cumulative in nature and include all
of the available remedies for breach.”127 To put the strongest
face on her position regarding the mandatory relevance of
substitute transactions, Peters concludes her discussion with
the following policy points:
A non-restrictive reading of the various remedies sections to
preserve full options to use or to ignore substitute transactions as a
measure of damages makes more sense . . . for a number of reasons.
It preserves a parity of remedy for buyers and sellers. It is consistent
with a number of other Code sections which frown on premature
election of remedies. It is a good deal easier to administer, since it
would be most difficult to ferret out from a reluctant complainant
information about transactions sufficiently related to the contract in
breach to qualify as cover or resale. Finally, preservation of the
option encourages recourse to actual market substitutes, since it
guarantees to the injured party that he will not lose all remedy in
the event of an unusually favorable substitute contract. It is thus
consistent with the Code’s overall interest in keeping goods moving
in commerce as rapidly as possible.128

Virtually all of the rival explanations for why a buyer
who covers is deemed to have elected a remedy are exemplified
by the explanation given by White and Summers. First, they
point to Comment 5 to section 2-713, which expressly indicates
that an election has occurred: “The present section provides a
remedy which is completely alternative to cover under the
preceding section and applies only when and to the extent that
the buyer has not covered.”129
Peters, supra note 3, at 260.
U.C.C. § 2-703 cmt. 1. Similarly, section 2-711 lists the buyer’s remedies
following non-delivery by the seller, but its alternative wording suggests to Peters the
strong possibility that it “requires damages to be measured by cover if cover has been
effectuated.” Peters, supra note 3, at 260. She ultimately rejects this conclusion for
reasons of both policy and drafting history. See id.
128 Peters, supra note 3, at 260-61.
129 U.C.C. § 2-713 cmt. 5; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 410. Peters does
not ignore this comment, but dismisses its import with the observation that “nothing
supporting this position can be found in the text of section 2-713.” Peters, supra note 3,
at 260. Although the comments play an extremely prominent role in Code
interpretation, Peters’ statement reflects the view that courts and commentators ought
to be particularly cautious about following a comment on a matter that does not appear
126
127
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Next comes the familiar refrain about overcompensation or
windfall concerns. Allowing the “higher damages of contractmarket differential” they write, is “contrary to the general principle
of Revised 1-305(a) and its predecessor, 1-106, (in as good a position
as if the other party had performed and no more).”130
The interplay between overcompensation concerns and
the now-moribund project to revise Article 2 provides a
wonderful opportunity to see that the stridency with which
these concerns is offered can cast a shadow over the statutory
drafting process and deter more liberal grants of remedial
options. At the outset, consider how the drafters decided to
address the issue of election of remedies in a new section 2-701,
which appeared for the first time in the December 1993 draft.131
Subsection (e) of that section read as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this Article or the agreement, the
rights and remedies provided by this Article are cumulative.
However, a court may deny a remedy if, under the circumstances, it
would put the aggrieved party in a substantially better position than
if the other party had fully performed.132

As Professor Anderson points out, this explicit statutory
sanction of even insubstantial “overcompensation” was seen by
many to be a radical departure from existing law and generated
a firestorm of criticism.133 At first, the Drafting Committee
responded to this criticism by essentially ignoring it.134
in the statutory text. In doing so, there is the real risk of carrying out policies that
cannot be tied to any particular legislative judgment. This problem arises in many
cases where the comments seem designed to function more as legislation than merely
as a means of discerning the meaning of statutory language. This point was expressly
recognized by the New York Law Revision Commission in its criticism of the comments:
“A more serious objection arises from instances in which the [c]omments appear to
qualify the text or to add further rules not supported by the text.” N. Y. STATE LAW
REVISION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1956: REPORT
RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 26 (1956).
130 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 410. In the cases under section 2-713
to date, the courts have found little difficulty with the issue. See, e.g., Flood v. M.P.
Clark, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 970 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (a buyer who elects to cover may not
obtain market-based damages). Roy Anderson has summarized the extant case law as
follows: “Over thirty years of case law under article 2 has demonstrated that both
sellers and buyers do attempt to use market-based damages to achieve windfall
recoveries. In reply, the courts have regularly . . . frustrate[d] these attempts.”
Anderson, supra note 6, at 1072 (internal citations omitted).
131 Drafts of Revised Article 2 dating back to 1996 are available online
through the Uniform Law Commission website at http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Committee.aspx?title=Commercial%20Code%20Article%202,%20Sales,%20and%20Arti
cle%202A,%20Leases. Older drafts are on file with the Commission. For a more
detailed exposition of the relevant drafting history, see Anderson, supra note 6, at
1072-81. The summary in this article is drawn from that work.
132 Proposed U.C.C. § 2-701(e) (Discussion Draft Dec. 1993).
133 See Anderson, supra note 6, at 1076 (“The provision drew heated criticism,
primarily from the ABA Task Force, largely on the bases that the provision conflicted
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But an important point to appreciate about the Code
revision and drafting processes is that criticism matters.135
Thus, we see in the October 1, 1995 Discussion Draft a more
traditional approach to remedial choice.136 No longer was the
term “substantial” used to modify overcompensation.137 The
accompanying reporter’s note goes on to explain that:
[T]he court, if requested by the defendant, may deny a particular
choice when that remedy under the circumstances puts the
aggrieved party in a better position than full performance would
have done. In most cases, this will occur when the aggrieved party’s
choice of damages based upon the difference between contract and
market price substantially exceeds the profits that would have been
made by full performance. Subsection (c) also rejects the view that
the exercise of one remedy, such as resale by the seller,
automatically precludes a subsequent choice to pursue another
remedy, such as market damages. Again, the question is whether the
choice exceeds the expectation principle.138

It seems the view that damages should be limited to
actual compensation is the most important take away from the
note, but the analysis is cursory and confusing at best. First, we
are told that the court “may” deny a remedy that puts the
aggrieved party in a better position. Why not “shall”? Second,
with the compensation mandate . . . and that there is no historical antecedent in the
law of contract for a ‘substantial’ overcompensation limitation.”).
134 The Reporter’s notes in the very next discussion draft point out that:
Revised subsection (e) reinforces the idea that remedies are cumulative but
then imposes a limitation that controls remedial choice throughout Part 7: A
court, at the petition of the defendant, may deny or limit a remedy if under
the circumstances it would put the aggrieved party “in a substantially better
position than if the other party had fully performed.”
Proposed U.C.C. § 2-701 reporter’s note 4 (Discussion Draft July 29-Aug. 5 1994).
135 In order for a Code project to be completely successful, universal
enactment by the states is necessary. For that to happen there must be a compromise
consensus among interested parties that grows from diversity of thought and
experience. Consequently, informed and substantive critique of drafts is essential and
taken seriously by drafting committees and reporters. For a small sampling of the
commentary on the Code drafting and revision processes, see Kathleen Patchel,
Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from
the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking
Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC
Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. Rev. 743 (1993); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article
9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994).
136 See generally Proposed U.C.C. § 2-703(c) (Discussion Draft Oct. 1, 1995).
137 The new provision, now section 2-703(c), read as follows:
The rights and remedies provided in this chapter are cumulative, but a party
may not recover more than once for the same injury. A court may deny or
limit a remedy if, under the circumstances, it would put the aggrieved party
in a better position than if the other party had fully performed.
Id.
138

Id. § 2-703 reporter’s note 4.
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the note emphatically rejects the election of remedies doctrine.
Market damages are not automatically unavailable if, for
example, the seller resells. When would it be unavailable? Why
would a seller who has resold ever choose market damages if the
amount did not exceed the resale/contract price differential?139
Surprisingly, the term “substantially” reappeared in the
November 1996 Discussion Draft without explanation.140 The
reason for the surprise is that the ABA Task Force was highly
critical of the possibility that overcompensation may be
permitted and it overtly threatened to lobby against a Revised
Article 2 with such a provision when the draft was presented to
the American Law Institute and American Bar Association for
their approval.141 In order to reduce objection, the Reporter
undertook to prepare a Note summarizing the positions taken
by the participants at the November 1996 meeting of the
Drafting Committee and suggesting how section 2-803(c)
should be applied.142
The attempted “fix” was not successful. Even with this
Note, there was little support for section 2-803(c) and active
opposition to this section and other aspects of Revised Article 2
continued.143 As a result, the Drafting Committee was
139 Anderson, too, finds this Note confusing. See Anderson, supra note 6, at
1077 (“The Notes . . . acknowledge that problems of overcompensation would usually
arise when a party attempts to have damages measured based on market price, but
then confusingly suggested that the mere fact that the injured party had engaged in a
true substitute transaction, such as resale of the goods, did not necessarily preclude its
recovery of market-based damages.”).
140 The section was changed to 2-803(c) and read as follows:

The rights and remedies provided in this article are cumulative, but a party
may not recover more than once for the same injury. A court may deny or
limit a remedy, if, under the circumstances, it would put the aggrieved party
in a substantially better position than if the other party had fully performed.
Proposed U.C.C. § 2-803(c) (Discussion Draft Nov. 1, 1996) (emphasis in original). See
Anderson, supra note 6, at 1078 (“No explanation for the reinclusion was given.”).
141 See Anderson, supra note 6, at 1077 n.68.
142 The significant features of this Note are discussed in Anderson, supra note
6, at 1079-81. At this point in the drafting process there were essentially three points
of view regarding the merits of section 2-803(c):
Proponents of retaining the provision had emphasized the importance of
maintaining the principle of free election of remedies. . . . Opponents of the
provision had been a curious mix, about half expressing concern that section
2-803(c) would be used by courts to allow overcompensation, while the
remainder expressed concern that courts would apply the provision to restrict
plaintiffs to the smallest measurement regardless of the actual damages.
Id. at 1079.

143 In a final attempt to address the concerns and reservations expressed, the
Drafting Committee asked the Reporter to prepare a “Comment” to the section, which
first appeared in the April 1997 Discussion Draft. This Comment turned out to be
unpersuasive and did little to change minds. See id. at 1110-11 (noting that “[a]lthough
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reconstituted with a new Reporter and Chair and the revision
project was downgraded to a series of amendments,144 thus
bringing to an end the story of section 2-803(c). All that
remained of the statutory product of the overcompensation
debate was a new Comment 7 to amended section 2-713, which
read as follows:
A buyer that has covered under Section 2-712 may not recover the
contract price market price difference under this section, but instead
must base the damages on those provided in Section 2-712. To award
an additional amount because the buyer could show the market price
was higher than the contract price would put the buyer in a better
position than performance would have. Of course, the seller would
bear the burden of proving that cover had the economic effect of
limiting the buyer’s actual loss to an amount less than the contract
price-market price difference.145

The problem with this entire debate, as evidenced by
the foregoing discussion of the Article 2 drafting project, is that
it responds to the wrong question: “Under what circumstances,
if any, should an aggrieved buyer or seller be overcompensated
for the harm resulting from the other party’s breach?”146 The
utility of this question depends upon the accuracy of its
underlying premise, which is, of course, that ignoring an actual
market transaction (cover or resale) in favor of market
damages overcompensates. But as the reader must now
appreciate, this premise overlooks the more realistic
probability that an award that appears to overcompensate
may not do so in practice, once the costs of litigation (both
nothing new or particularly instructive is offered, there is the implicit assurance that
nothing in section 2-803 is intended to restructure the application of article 2 damage
remedies”). The Comment is reproduced in its entirety in id. at app. 1119.
144 The course of events can be summarized as follows: Professor Speidel and
Associate Reporter, Linda J. Rusch (Rusch served as an Associate Reporter from 199699), resigned in protest at the 1999 annual meeting of the Uniform Law Commission
following a decision by its leadership to postpone a scheduled reading of the final draft
of Revised Article 2 until July 2000. It was then that a new Reporter and Chair were
appointed and the downgrading occurred. Eventually, Amended Article 2 received final
approval at both the 2002 annual meeting of the Law Commission and the 2003 annual
meeting of the American Law Institute.
145 U.C.C. § 2-713 cmt. 7 (amended 2003). It is interesting to note that this
Comment, presumably written by the new Reporter, Henry Gabriel, expresses a
position that is inconsistent with the free election position that he had taken
previously. See Henry Gabriel, The Seller’s Election of Remedies Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: An Expectation Theory, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 449 (1988). It
is reasonable to believe that he was under institutional pressure to appease opposing
interest groups, particularly the ABA Task Force.
146 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 6, at 1117 (commenting on the “substantial
overcompensation” limitation in Revised Section 2-803(c), he observes that “subsection
(c) offers the court the discretion to overcompensate. Courts will undoubtedly be asked
to entertain that discretion in cases in which plaintiffs, sellers or buyers, seek to use
market-based damages to achieve windfall recoveries”).
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those that are measurable but not legally recoverable and
those that are immeasurable) are taken into account.
The more meaningful question might be: “Is there a
compelling reason, when overcompensation concerns are
removed from the calculus, to require the aggrieved party who
has engaged in a market transaction to elect that remedy over
the general market price remedy?” The answer to that question
is “No.” However, what about the argument that courts should
be assigned the task of considering all costs of litigation and
determining, in each case, whether overcompensation will really
occur? The most serious problem with that approach is the
enormous
cost
of
effectuation.
Determining
“real”
overcompensation requires a complex, fact-based adjudication
should be rejected for that reason alone. It is with that in mind
that we turn to the next section which will establish why an
award of damages based on the difference between a hypothetical
cover price and the contract price can, in reality, be transformed
into a recovery for lost profits.
IV.

AN ICONOCLASTIC VIEW OF MARKET PRICE: MUCH ADO
ABOUT SOMETHING

Market price is a central concept to the application of
section 2-713. It is a critical element of the statutory formula
that measures both the buyer’s general damages and, if the
buyer had already entered into a resale contract, the amount of
its consequential damages under section 2-715(2).147 Those
consequential damages only exist if the buyer is, in turn, held
liable to its sub-buyer under section 2-713 for the breach of the
resale contract.148 But there are apparent difficulties with any
formula that relies on market price.
First, market price may vary at different times and
places. Consequently, the drafters had to specify the relevant
place and time at which to determine market price. They
established the relevant place as “the place for tender or, in
cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of
the place of arrival”149 and the relevant time as “when the
buyer learned of the breach.”150 What they neglected to do,

147 Since the buyer’s claim for consequential damages would be subject to section
2-715(2), it would have to show both an inability to cover and that the harm involved was
foreseeable by the seller at the time the contract was made. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (2013).
148 Id. § 2-713.
149 Id. § 2-713(2).
150 Id. § 2-713(1).
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however, was to provide us with a statutory designation (e.g.,
wholesale or retail) of the appropriate market.
The unchallenged assumption, by courts and
commentators alike, is that the relevant market in which to
determine price is the market in which the buyer is likely to go to
make a substitute purchase (i.e., cover). This view of the relevant
market is implicit in the geographic and temporal choices made
by the drafters and is made explicit in the Comments: “The
general baseline adopted in this section uses as a yardstick the
market in which the buyer would have obtained cover had he
sought that relief.”151 The appropriateness of the cover market
seems most compelling with respect to those buyers who intend to
retain the good for their own personal use. After all, their
ultimate interest is in turning cash into goods ($  goods).
However, for buyers who intend to resell the goods, the cover
market is less relevant, for what they care most about is
converting cash into more cash ($  goods  $$). There is no
statutory mandate that we treat dissimilar buyers in a similar
way.152 In fact, the jurisprudence and history of U.C.C. Article 2 as
a realistic, fact-sensitive set of rules plainly contradicts that idea.
It was Llewellyn’s strong belief that to achieve “The
Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law,”153 its rules
have to be informed by reality—they have to be grounded in
fact-situations—with emphasis placed upon the circumstances
of the overall setting of the transaction.154 These considerations
can be seen throughout Article 2 supporting, for example, the
principles of unconscionability,155 good faith,156 and a provision
mandating that every agreement be read to include any
applicable usage of the particular trade.157
Id. § 2-713 cmt. 1.
Recall that it is not the purpose of this article to advocate for any
substantive legal change that would require a revision to or an amendment of Article 2.
Notwithstanding the statement in the Comment regarding the appropriate market,
courts are free to adopt a “better” approach if one were offered. See id.
153 Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s
Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J.
1141 (1985). The title of Professor Hillinger’s article is drawn from the words Llewellyn
himself used as a title to a series of lectures. See K. N. Llewellyn, On the Good, The
True, The Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224 (1942). For Llewellyn, the quest for
beautiful law meant that he had to create “a body of sales law which is clean, clear,
guidesome, which it is almost impossible to misconstrue.” 1 STATE OF N.Y. LAW
REVISION COMM’N, HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 160 (1954).
154 See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 457-59 (1930); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1237 (1931).
155 U.C.C. § 2-302.
156 Id. § 1-304.
157 Id. § 1-303(c).
151

152
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Another place where Llewellyn elevates commercial
reality into the law is in section 2-509 (“Risk of Loss in the
Absence of Breach”).158 In pre-Code days the concept of title
served as the jack-of-all-trades in sales law.159 One had only to
decide who had title and then the answers would neatly follow to
such diverse questions as where the risk of loss lay, whether the
seller could maintain an action for the price, whether the buyer
could replevy the goods, and whether the seller’s or buyer’s
creditors could levy on the goods.160 But for Llewellyn, the
neatness of such a singularity of issue was not worth its price:
The quarrel thus is, first, with the use of Title for purposes of
decision as if the location of Title were determinable with certainty;
and second, with the insistence on reaching for a single lump to solve
all or most of the problems between seller and buyer—and even in
regard to third parties.161

Thus, when the drafting of the Code began, Llewellyn
was convinced that the time had come to scrap title as a means
to resolve sales controversies.162 The unpredictable application163
and irrationality164 of title led Llewellyn to fear that if its thenprominent role were enshrined in the Code, the effects would be
intolerable. Making the most of his opportunity, Llewellyn
boldly relegated title to backseat status in the Code. In its place
are specific rules premised on considerations peculiar to the
problem at hand. Take, for example, the default rules governing
risk of loss. The several rules stated in section 2-509 are based
on different methods of delivery and the character of the seller.
By dealing with risk of loss in a number of settings, the risk is
theoretically placed on the party in the best position to insure
against loss or take the necessary steps to avoid it. Thus, we
have a far more practical solution to the issue than the location
of title approach of pre-Code law.
Perhaps the most significant set of provisions that
illustrate Llewellyn’s realist tenet that legal rules must relate
Id. § 2-509.
See generally K. N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond,
15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 159 (1938).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 166.
162 Id. at 166-67.
163 Llewellyn explained: “Nobody ever saw a chattel’s Title. Its location in
Sales cases is not discovered, but created, often ad hoc.” Id. at 165.
164 Referring to the concept of “title” or “property,” Llewellyn fancifully wrote: “when,
in addition, ‘the property’ bounces around from party to party according to the issue, it begins
to look as if ‘the property in the goods,’ as an issue-determiner, were in the mercantile cases, a
farmer far from the dell, and none too well adjusted to the new environment.” K. N. Llewellyn,
Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 733 (1939).
158
159

212

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1

to the facts and circumstances of a given transaction are those
that single out merchants for special treatment. Here,
Llewellyn certainly intended to make rules more realistic or
closer to the actual behavior of market participants. In a
comment to the 1940 draft of the Uniform Sales Act, he wrote:
There are a considerable number of situations in Sales in which the
practices, understandings, and needs between merchants are
strikingly different from those where one of the parties or both
stands outside the business course of dealing-as-a-business. A
private buyer of furniture, for instance, can find the goods wholly
unusable for him because of an error in color or finish, whereas the
same defect could be readily adjusted with a dealer-buyer. The
processes of negotiating adjustment are different. The speed of
remedy required is different.165

Thus, Article 2 contains 13 provisions specifically tailored for
merchants.166 In some cases, merchant obligations are placed
upon the merchant regardless of whether the other party
qualifies as a merchant.167 However, in others, the obligations
are imposed in transactions “between merchants.”168 Although
one might quibble with the substance of Llewellyn’s statusbased classification, no one has argued that the status of the
parties should be irrelevant.169
But why should any classification-based structure of
rules not take into account other distinctions that may exist
with regard to the categories of buyers and sellers? Indeed, as
early as the 1930s, Professor Nathan Isaacs wrote a series of
articles critical of the “cash-and-carry” conceptualism of the
Uniform Sales Act of 1906.170 He was mindful that squeezing a
single set of rules out of a stereotypical transaction had its
advantages—but at what cost?171 If the law of sales failed to
165 REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT, supra note 16, at 178 (at “Comment On
‘Merchant’ Insert Into § 1”).
166 A “merchant” is defined as “a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction.” U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2013).
167 See, e.g., id. § 2-205.
168 See, e.g., id. § 2-201(2).
169 For a suggested alternative to the merchant/non-merchant distinction see,
e.g., Hillinger, supra note 153, at 1184 (“In the abstract, then, Llewellyn’s Article 2
principle of discrimination seems sound, but his actual discrimination along
merchant/nonmerchant lines is at least open to question. Today, the relevant principle
of discrimination may be consumer/nonconsumer . . . .”).
170 See Nathan Isaacs, The Industrial Purchaser and the Sales Act, 34 COLUM.
L. REV. 262, 262 (1934) (describing the type of sale envisioned by the Sales Act “as one
by a dealer who is likely to be the maker, to a lay consumer. The picture is satisfied by
the horseman who stops at the sadler’s door to buy a new saddle”); see also Nathan
Isaacs, Dealer-Purchaser, 1 U. CIN. L. REV. 373 (1927).
171 Isaacs suggested that the approach taken by the Uniform Sales Act was to
be expected in an era of mass production. See Isaacs, The Industrial Purchaser, supra
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track the differences that actually existed among market
participants, he argued that we would see a “lack of plasticity
or adjustability to time and circumstance, artificiality,
inaccuracy, and occasional hardship.”172 Isaacs’ interest in and
insistence upon having the law conform to actual markets led
him to suggest a refinement of sales law that would, at a
minimum, take into account the different circumstances that
surround transactions by a seller-manufacturer, consumerpurchaser, dealer-purchaser, and manufacturer-purchaser.173
Two things seem fairly obvious. First, that Llewellyn
was quite familiar with the practical ideas on classification
expressed by Isaacs in his articles.174 Second, and perhaps more
importantly, Llewellyn shared those ideas.175 Like Isaacs, his
skepticism about the merits of traditional legal distinctions or
classification was pervasive. He was convinced that, if not
drawn accurately enough, these distinctions would inevitably
lead to partial, inconsistent, and incorrect analyses of contract
problems.176 He tended to regard the then-existing classification
scheme of sales law as too “overbroad for intelligent use.”177
Now, consider the undetailed and imprecise concepts like
“seller” and “buyer.” Within each there is neither guidance for
the judge nor any substantive rules to create meaningful
differences in the results of the cases. Yet, Llewellyn believed
that there is a remarkable contrast among sellers who are
note 170, at 262 (“This was an era of mass production in law as well as industry, in which
jurisprudence was more concerned with supplying cheap, quick, easy, machine-made
frameworks for all business transactions than with the fine adjustment of any one of
these frameworks to serve the needs of carefully studied individualized situations.”).
172 Id.
173 See generally id.
174 See Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 159, at 159 (describing the
scholarship produced by Isaacs as “the most challenging material on our [s]ales law
which I have seen in print”). Moreover, Professor Wiseman suggests the possibility that
Llewellyn got the idea for the titles of two of his articles (see Llewellyn, Across Sales on
Horseback, supra note 164; K. N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52
HARV. L. REV. 873 (1939)) from the “horseman” and “saddle” picture of sales law
painted by Isaacs. See Isaacs, The Industrial Purchaser, supra note 170, at 263;
Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 477 n.43 (1987).
175 See Wiseman, supra note 174, at 477 n.43.
176 Llewellyn intimated this when he wrote:
The building of rules of law is by its very nature based on classification.
Sound and wise building of rules of law calls for sound and wise classification
of the problem-situations. Such classification makes for justice-in-result[.]
K. N. Llewellyn, Memorandum Replying to the Report and Memorandum of Task
Group 1 of the Special Committee of the Commerce and Industry Association of New
York, Inc. on the Uniform Commercial Code (Aug. 16, 1954), reprinted in 1 STATE OF
N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 153, at 108.
177 See Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 159, at 160.
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manufacturers, wholesalers, and large and small retailers.178 He
also drew similar distinctions among buyers who are consumers,
dealers, and industrial buyers for use.179 These subcategories are
consistent with Llewellyn’s commercial law conceptualism and
are best seen in his fixation on expanding the scope of the legally
relevant in the underlying transaction.180
Why is it, therefore, in light of Llewellyn’s concern for
commercial reality, that Article 2 fails to differentiate among
these various subcategories of buyers and sellers?181 Whether
this statutory neglect of distinctions is the result of Llewellyn’s
assessment of the politics of legal change, a fear that he might
be slicing doctrine a bit too thin, or perhaps some other cause,
we have no way of knowing.182 Whichever may be the cause,
nothing would suggest that, in some instances, sales law would
not be improved by recognizing the need for different treatment
for buyers and sellers.
Against this background, a reasonable assumption is that
Llewellyn probably would have agreed that the adoption of a
single, uniform market price standard in all section 2-713 actions
should be rejected as too inflexible and simplistic to adequately
address the compensation objectives of buyers for use and buyers
for resale. The importance of the intended use of property in the
determination of market price or value has for some time been the
subject of heated debate in legal areas other than sales. Perhaps
178
179
180

Id.
Id. at 160-61.
As Professor Wiseman notes:

The logic of Llewellyn’s jurisprudence and his views on sales law would lead
to many more distinctions than simply that of merchant and nonmerchant.
For example, it would call for the recognition of the differences in the needs,
practices, and expectations of a merchant buyer for use from those of a
merchant buyer for resale, the differences of a manufacturer from a
distributor, and so on. And the logic of Llewellyn’s jurisprudence might also
be seen to require distinguishing between an automobile merchant and a
grain merchant. In fact, one of the three indexes to Llewellyn’s casebook on
Sales is an index by commodity.
Wiseman, supra note 174, at 506 n.183 (internal citation omitted).
181 An implicit differentiation may on occasion result from Llewellyn’s decision
to make any applicable usage of trade a component part of the parties’ agreement. For
the Code’s definition of “agreement,” see U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (2013).
182 See Wiseman, supra note 174, at 506 n.183 (commenting on Llewellyn’s
failure to discuss these distinctions at any time during the drafting of Article 2, she
states that “[w]hether it was pragmatic political wisdom or a decision that such
discussion would carry atomization of legal rules too far is difficult to know”). We do
know, however, that Lewellyn was resigned to the reality that many highly desirable
legal changes would not work themselves into Article 2. Maybe he just tired of legal
skirmishes. He once remarked that he was “ashamed of [the Code] in some ways; there
are so many pieces that I could make a little better; there are so many beautiful ideas I
tried to get in that would have been good for the law, but I was voted down.” Karl
Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 784 (1953).
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the most significant of these areas is the attempt to establish a
use-theory of value for application in bankruptcy.
Valuations of property (both real and personal) occur in
bankruptcy for reasons that are both too numerous and
complex to detail here.183 However, two examples should suffice
to illustrate that the contexts in which these valuations are
required are diverse and implicate numerous sections and
chapters of the Bankruptcy Code. Consider first, relief from the
automatic stay that goes into effect upon commencement of a
bankruptcy case and stays all creditor actions against the debtor
or property of the estate.184 One ground for obtaining relief from
the stay as it pertains to particular property is for a party in
interest (e.g., a secured party) to establish that the “debtor does
not have an equity in such property.”185 It is impossible to
determine whether the debtor has any “equity” in property
unless one knows the property’s value.
A second example of when a valuation of property is
necessary is when it comes time to classify the claim(s) of a
secured creditor under section 506(a). That section states that
a claim is secured to the extent of the collateral’s value and is
unsecured as to any deficiency. Thus, an under-secured debt is
split into a secured and unsecured claim, thereby reflecting the
reality that the extent of a security interest is necessarily
limited by the value of the collateral. Clearly, then, the court
must value the collateral to determine the creditor’s cram
down, voting and other rights that depend for their application
upon whether a claim is secured or unsecured.186
Given the importance of assessing value in bankruptcy,
a court is faced with the predicament of having to choose
between competing valuation standards.187 Up until 2005, the
Bankruptcy Code was relatively silent on the issue. Its only
guidance came from section 506(a), which stated that value
“shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation
and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in
conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a
plan affecting such creditor’s interest.”188 This statement and
183 For a list of some of these reasons, see David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors
and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 65-70 (1991).
184 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2012).
185 Id.
186 Many of these rights are covered in Carlson, supra note 183, at 67-70.
187 Id. at 64 (“Because valuations are not verifiable propositions, it is
impossible to say as an objective matter whether valuation standards must adhere to
‘liquidation’ versus ‘going concern’ value, or between ‘use’ or ‘exchange’ value, or
whether valuation should be ex ante or ex post transaction costs.”).
188 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
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its legislative history suggest that courts will have to
determine the relevant valuation standard on a case-by-case
basis and that a valuation at one time for one purpose would
not be binding at a later time for another purpose.189 Then, in
2005, as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act, Congress added a new paragraph to
section 506(a), which establishes that the applicable standard
of valuation as to an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 or 13
shall be “replacement value.”190
Even if one grants the wisdom of the Court and
Congress in setting the proper valuation standard for Chapters
7 and 13 individuals, it is simply implausible to believe that
the serious ambiguity that surrounds the concept of value has
been finally removed from bankruptcy practice. Difficulties
remain with the analysis in those cases within the scope of
section 506(a)(2),191 but the problems are far greater when no
statutory basis exists. Courts are faced with the choice of either
liquidation or going concern value. In making this choice,
courts have tended to associate the former value with
liquidation cases and the latter value in reorganization cases.192
Such an approach has the virtue of uniformity of application
and is consistent with section 506(a), which requires
consideration of how the property is being used.193
189 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5854; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6312.
190 Section 506(a)(2) reads as follows:

If the debtor is an individual in a case under chapter 7 or 13, [the value of]
personal property securing an allowed claim shall be determined based on the
replacement value of such property as of the date of the filing of the petition
without deduction for costs of sale or marketing. With respect to property
acquired for personal, family, or household purposes, replacement value shall
mean the price a retail merchant would charge for property of that kind
considering the age and condition of the property at the time value is determined.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2). This section has as it source the Supreme Court’s decision in
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997). In that case, the Chapter 13
debtors proposed to retain the collateral (a truck) for use in a freight-hauling business.
Their Chapter 13 plan proposed to cram down the secured party by paying the present
value of the collateral in 58 monthly installments. The debtors argued that the
standard for valuing the truck should be foreclosure value. The Court disagreed and
held that a replacement value applied.
191 Section 506(a)(2) does not settle the valuation issue, since it says nothing
as to the choice between replacement at retail cost, replacement at wholesale cost, or
replacement at a cost indicated in a widely distributed publication of price quotations,
such as Bluebook.
192 See Carlson, supra note 183, at 76.
193 See, e.g., id. (“Very frequently, courts choose going concern value in
reorganization cases and choose liquidation value in liquidation cases.”); see also Isaac
M. Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 58 N.C. L. REV. 925, 939 (1980) (arguing that “[i]t is incongruous to value a
business that is being reorganized on the basis of the price its assets could fetch on a
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In the end, the valuation theorist must rest his claims
on the idea that value is necessarily a function of the purpose
of the exercise and the anticipated use of the property. Thus, it
is of no small import that such a theorist recognize that if there
is no fixed meaning of the term “value” generally, what reason
is there to believe that there should be a unitary concept of
“value” in the field of damages that fails to give effect to its
purpose and the situation at hand. This translates to nothing
more than making a determination of value relevant to
practical concerns.
Returning to section 2-713, one question that has been
uniformly ignored entails the market price component of its
damages formula. The question is, which market? To answer
this question, Comment 1 states that “[t]he general baseline
adopted in [section 2-713] uses as a yardstick the market in
which the buyer would have obtained cover had he sought that
relief.”194 But this conventional market definition can lead to
ambiguity and confusion when a contrast is drawn between two
basic categories of buyers: there are those buyers who buy for
use or consumption and those buyers who buy for resale. It is
important to differentiate between these two categories. With
regard to those buyers who purchase for use, not for sale, there
is little reason to be skeptical of an approach that looks to the
price in the relevant cover market. To the extent that section 2713 is designed to reflect a hypothetical universe in which the
buyer purchases substitute goods, there can be no other market
that makes even remote sense.
Quite a different possibility emerges when the buyer is
some sort of middleman who intends to resell the goods. The
consequence of middleman status is that two markets compete
for attention: there is the market in which the buyer buys and
the market in which it resells. Assume for example, that the
seller breaches a contract to supply goods at $8,000 to a
wholesaler or middleman buyer. The market price at the time
the buyer learns of the breach, in the wholesale market in
which he normally buys, is $10,000. On that same date, the
higher retail market price in the buyer’s selling market is
$15,000. All academic commentary and case law assumes that
piecemeal liquidation when the entire theory of the reorganization is that the debtor is
being preserved as a going concern”). Of course, as with any other legal proposition,
there are those who would dissent from the commonly accepted wisdom. See, e.g., In re
T.H.B. Corp., 85 B.R. 192, 196 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (noting that “[t]he fact that the
debtor is a going concern is no reason to value the collateral under the going concern
standard unless it appears likely that the secured party will actually receive that value
from its collateral through a pending sale”).
194 U.C.C. § 2-713, cmt. 1 (2013).
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the relevant market price for purposes of section 2-713 is
$10,000 and asks whether the buyer should be permitted to
recover a total of $9,000 (consequential damages for the lost
resale contract added to the buyer’s market damages).195 The
standard answer to this question is that only consequential
damages may be recovered.196
More subtly, we might realize that if the market price
that matters for purposes of section 2-713 is the price at which
the goods could be sold by the buyer, the preceding issue would
no longer concern us. Even more subtly, this approach to
market price would have the effect of transforming what are
now perceived to be consequential damages recoverable under
section 2-715 to general or direct damages recoverable under
section 2-713.197 By this process of redefinition, damage claims
that were previously denied would potentially become
195 Of course the claim for consequential damages assumes an inability to
cover and that the loss was foreseeable by the seller at the time of contracting. See
U.C.C. § 2-715.
196 The following hypothetical (from which the above figures are borrowed)
appears in a former edition of the White and Summers treatise is typical:

Assume for example, that a buyer sues wholesaler for nondelivery of a
shipment of fiberglass skiis [sic] under section 2-713. He might ask for the
market-contract differential (assume it is $10,000–$8,000) plus consequential
damages[,] which are lost resale profits. If he could resell the shipment of
skiis [sic] at $15,000 but he cannot cover, his lost profits will be $7,000
($15,000–$8,000). Should a court allow a recovery of $9,000 (the marketcontract differential plus lost profits)? First, 2-715(2)(a) requires cover if it is
at all reasonable, and that principle would eliminate profits in most cases.
Secondly, in the unusual case where cover is impossible the court should
award only $7,000 since that amount will put the wholesaler in the same
position he would have been in if the manufacturer had sent the skiis [sic]. If
a court gives the buyer the market-contract differential of $2,000 under 2713, then the “loss resulting” from the wholesaler’s inability to resell under 2715(2)(a) is only $5,000.
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 394-95 n.91 (2d ed. 1980); see also Childres, supra note 2, at 843-44
(“When B cannot get the contract or comparable goods, may he then get the section 2713, market price-contract price differential remedy or measure of damages? And may
this come ‘together with any . . . consequential damages . . . ’? . . . Consequentials he
should recover, within tolerable standards, but not ‘together with’ anything.”). The
same conclusion was reached in M. K. Metals, Inc. v. Container Recovery Corp., 645
F.2d 583, 590-91 (8th Cir. 1981) (agreeing with White and Summers that the buyer
should recover only lost profits because “to allow damages on both of appellant’s
theories would amount to double recovery”).
197 Although the distinction between consequential damages and general or
direct damages can at times be muddled and difficult to draw, it seems clear enough
that, at least under the Code, the latter category is encompassed by the formulae of
sections 2-712, 2-713 and 2-714, and the former category results from losses that fall
outside these sections and are not delineated as incidental damages under section 2715(1). Lost profits on a contemplated resale is the most common type of economic-loss
claim that is viewed as consequential damages. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Rachelle Labs.,
Inc. 661 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1981).
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recoverable today. The reasons for this are several, but one
stands out as the most significant.198
Consequential damages within the scope of section 2715(2) are limited to those “which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise.”199 There is, however, no
mitigation requirement that would bar a buyer from a recovery
under section 2-713 merely because she decided not to take
advantage of an available cover option.200 Therefore, a court
inclined to take the approach suggested here to the
determination of market price might well give an aggrieved
buyer its consequential damages without regard to whether the
lost profit could have been minimized by reasonable steps
taken to replace the promised goods.
This idea, that lost resale profits should be measured
through the medium of market price, not only tends to bring
the buyer closer to full compensation, it avoids what may be a
number of potentially difficult issues. Gone would be the need
to determine and allocate overhead expenses that would
otherwise have to be deducted from the anticipated resale price
if the buyer seeks his expected profit directly under section 2715(2). Gone, too, would be the issues of whether there was a
replacement market for the goods and whether it would have
made good sense for the buyer to enter into that market.
These practical benefits aside, it is simply implausible
to maintain that an award of damages based on the difference
between a hypothetical cover price and the contract price is not
198 For losses that fall outside the sections that govern general damage, section
2-715(2)(a) limits liability by requiring general or particular requirements or needs of the
buyer that the seller had reason to know of at the time of contracting. Recovery of lost
profits under the rubric of section 2-713 would not require such a showing. However, such
a change in statutory focus is unlikely to alter the outcome of many cases. Presumably, “a
seller of a commodity to a wholesaler usually has reason to foresee that his failure to
deliver the commodity as agreed will probably cause the wholesaler to lose a reasonable
profit on it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. b (1981). A
“foreseeability” test would, therefore, in this situation, have little effect.
Recovery under section 2-713 might also make inapplicable a generally
worded clause limiting or excluding consequential damages under section 2-719(3).
However, one suspects that this consequence of shifting the buyer’s recovery from
section 2-715 to section 2-713 would be short-lived. Sellers would soon learn to redraft
clauses to address this change.
199 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
200 Professor Wallach explains as follows:

An expectation interest, traditionally labeled the “benefit of the bargain,” is
created once a contract has been formed. The buyer is entitled to the benefit
of that expectation, even if he chooses not to pursue the goods with which
that expectation is associated once the seller has repudiated the contract and
failed to deliver conforming goods.
George I. Wallach, The Buyer’s Right to Monetary Damages, 14 UCC L.J. 236, 242 (1981).
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in reality a recovery for lost profits. If the relevant market
price for purposes of section 2-713 is the cost of cover, then the
wholesale buyer is forced to recover one component of its lost
profit under that section and the remainder of its lost profit
under section 2-715(2)(a). Ultimately, a switch to resale market
price under section 2-713 eliminates this bifurcated recovery
and assigns to one section the task of dealing with two parts of
a total loss that share a common essence.201
CONCLUSION
A major assumption exists in the economic and contracts
literature that when one party breaches a contract, the normal
remedy of expectation damages will be sufficient to place the
aggrieved party in as good a position as it would have been in if
the contract had been performed. That is, the aggrieved party’s
expectations (“the benefit of its bargain”) are both a ceiling,
above which damages should not be awarded, and a floor, which
sets the minimum that the injured party should receive. One
purpose of this article has been to debunk the validity and
universality of this assumption. Given the real-world
transactions costs associated with enforcing contractual
obligations and the numerous legal limitations on damage
recoveries, routine undercompensation is the likely norm.
Why does a proper understanding of the myth and the
reality of the contracts compensation system matter? This
article has attempted to show that there are several significant
consequences that follow from a full appreciation of the
fundamental gulf between the harm caused by a person who
breaks her promise and the compensation received by her
victim. First, on the theoretical level, debunking the
compensation myth forces a reconsideration of the fundamental
premise underlying the theory of “efficient breach” and the
extent to which allocative efficiency is achieved by contract law.
Second, on a practical level, the insights offered in this article
raise questions about the present legal approaches to the
assessment of market-based damages under Article 2 of the
U.C.C.—approaches that seem to concentrate on the risk of

201 It is for this reason that the conclusion reached herein regarding the
question of mitigation should not necessarily apply when recovery is sought under
section 2-715(2)(a) for a loss that does not share the essence of market-based damages.
Because the buyer in essence owns the right to the seller’s performance and the right to
profit from the fluctuation of market price or market price arbitrage, no attempt at
mitigation should be required.
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overcompensation and give little recognition to administrative
efficiency and other remedial values.
In presenting a more realistic understanding of
compensation to the application of U.C.C. section 2-713, in
particular to those issues that bear on the buyer’s right to
choose this measure of damages, this article hopes to promote a
more nuanced and better integrated perception of these issues.
To the extent that current judicial solutions to many of the
section 2-713 issues stem from misperception of the
compensation system, and to the extent that the misperception
can be corrected, it is hoped that the change in perception
discussed here will lead to a change in the application of some
of the Code’s remedial provisions.

